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Abstract 
 
 
The integration of remote places around the world into common markets and the 
expansion of market based economies is one of the most transformative processes of the 
global capitalist age. While South East Asia, and the Philippines in particular, have long 
been part of international trade and related processes of agrarian transition the degree and 
speed of integration of remote areas directly into commodity flows and globalised 
markets is a newer phenomenon.  
 Rural areas in the Philippines are being integrated into market relations through 
diverse and varied processes such as the capitalization of agriculture, land titling and 
privatization, and the commodification of nature and lifestyles. The site of this study, the 
Caluya Islands, Philippines, offers a glimpse into the contingency and complexities of 
market integration experiences for socio-ecosystems. The aim of this study is to 
interrogate the differing processes and outcomes of two forms of market integration 
vying for the same space in the Caluya Islands: seaweed cultivation for export and 
international tourist development.  
 Political ecology frames the analysis of market integration in Caluya and help me 
interrogate the importance of material nature, the centrality of power, and the interplay 
between local and extra-local forces. Unlike, experiences with cash crops elsewhere, 
seaweed cultivation has been overwhelmingly beneficial in Caluya. I argue this is due to 
a particular ‘constellation’ of factors: the material characteristics both of seaweed and the 
space of Caluya; local social structures; and extra-local factors. This configuration has 
resulted in a sustainable, hybrid economy. In contrast, imminent tourism development 
pushes market relations into the centre of life here, potentially undermining stable 
socionatural structures and disrupting the constellation of conditions that keep this system 
viable. By exploring the contrasts between the two, my research contends that certain 
conditions and configurations can be identified that link market integration to positive 
benefits, rather than to marginalization and environmental degradation. 
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The undertaking of this research and MRP work has contributed to fulfilling the learning 
objectives set out in my MES plan of study. Specifically, it allows me to gain empirical 
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1. Introduction 
 
Mr R: Of course, [tourism] can only help us in the start. 
Mrs A: Tambalang[seaweed] never stops from helping. 
Mr R: That is what I said…that if we don’t have rice but we have 
tambalang we can dry it, sell it and use the money to buy rice… If I think 
of it, I do not agree; [tourism] is bad. 
Mrs A: What if they just pay us [for our seaweed area] now then no more, 
then what? 
Mr R: We earn a living here. 
Mrs M: …You can’t complain anymore. They[the developers] said in the 
meeting that if you have a problem you have to complain there and no 
more murmurs about it after, because there is a meeting already… 
Mrs E:… Like, those who have a degree can work, then I said, “how about 
us that don’t have a degree?” “How can we work?” 
Mrs O: Just sit down and watch. 
Mrs E: They answered that we can do massage…I said that I don’t want to 
do that. 
Mrs M: …People will just follow it. 
Mrs O: …They just follow it… 
      June 20, 2007. Conversation 
with seaweed planters on Sibolo Island, Caluya 
 
 
 
 The integration of remote places around the world into common markets and the 
expansion of market based economies is one of the most transformative processes of the 
global capitalist age. While South East Asia, and the Philippines in particular, have long 
been part of international trade and related processes of agrarian transition (Kelly 2000; 
Reid 1993), the degree and speed of integration of remote areas directly into commodity 
flows and globalised markets is a newer phenomenon.  
 Rural areas in the Philippines are being integrated into market relations through 
diverse and varied processes such as the capitalization of agriculture, land titling and 
privatization, and the commodification of nature and lifestyles. The site of this study, the 
Caluya Islands, Philippines, offers a glimpse into the contingent and complex nature of 
market integration experiences for socio-ecosystems. While local developments are 
increasingly linked in this way to global forces, they are not solely determined by them. 
Rather, unexpected outcomes often arise as local contexts articulate and assimilate extra-
local processes. Because of this, global generalizations and totalizing discourses that 
either accept market integration as intrinsically beneficial or reject it as completely 
negative fail to seize the opportunity to fully interrogate and try to understand the 
relational processes at work. I argue that is more helpful to look at how and why specific 
socionatural relations are changed and produced through processes of market integration 
so that we may understand which conditions are more likely to lead to marginalization 
and when conditions may have more sustainable and just outcomes. The aim of this study 
is to interrogate the differing processes and outcomes of two forms of market integration 
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vying for the same space in the Caluya Islands: aquaculture cash cropping and 
international tourist development.  
 Export-oriented aquaculture is rapidly spreading, especially in South East Asia, 
and is being increasingly framed in rural development terms. Aquaculture, as Barton and 
Staniford (1998) argue, can no longer be overlooked as a transformative force in rural 
change. This is certainly true in the Philippines, and the Caluya Islands are now a major 
producer of Eucheuma seaweed for carrageenan production and export. As fisheries, and 
concurrently, coastal livelihoods are threatened and declining, aquaculture will continue 
to expand as countries simultaneously try to tap into foreign markets and address food 
security. Ecosocial problems with many sectors of this phenomenon have been widely 
documented (e.g. Bryceson 2002; Escober 2006; Rivera et al. 2002; Santos et al. 2003), 
but rapid expansion continues and academic research can help clarify the myriad 
socionatural changes that result. In South East Asia, shrimp farming has been the focus of 
the majority of critical research on aquaculture. Comparatively little research has focused 
on plant aquaculture, though it is the second largest global aquaculture product by 
volume (FAO 2006). My research seeks to address this dearth in the scholarship, by 
focusing on seaweed, the Philippine’s largest, yet most invisible export aquaculture crop 
with approximately 150 000 families involved in the sector (Ferrer 2006). My study of 
this crop in Caluya asks if seaweed farming here has successfully alleviated rural poverty 
as the government and industry suggest that it does. Further, does it go beyond providing 
for basic necessities and also lead to empowerment and reshaping of rural inequities? 
 While seaweed cultivation is clearly a cash crop and shares characteristics of 
capitalist market relations, my research reveals that it does not fit with other documented 
cases in which export crops led to marginalization for small communities. In contrast, the 
expansion of this export crop in Caluya has led to the maintenance and rejuvenation of 
rural livelihoods and reduced the precarious nature of life there. The analysis of my 
empirical research seeks to explain why. How are seaweed as a crop and the local context 
intertwining to create a situation of relative stability?  
 Research also revealed that while seaweed cultivation has proven overwhelmingly 
beneficial for the Caluya Islands, the socioenvironment there is still vulnerable to 
ecosystem changes and shifts in political economic dynamics. Recent land purchases and 
development in Caluya, led by the Philippines largest land developer, seeks to displace 
seaweed cultivation in favour of tourism development. This threatens to reverse the 
positive outcomes achieved there of market integration through seaweed cultivation. The 
top down process and details of the tourist development proposal reveal a much different 
form of market integration than seen with seaweed cultivation. As such, the tourist 
development offers a counterfoil to help us understand how and why seaweed cultivation, 
even as it integrates Caluya further into global market relations, has created positive 
opportunities rather than dissolving and rupturing beneficial socionatural structures. 
 
The following research questions animate my analysis of market integration in the Caluya 
Islands and try to interrogate the importance of material nature, the centrality of power 
and the interplay between local and extra-local forces.  
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1. How are non-human actors and spaces mutually constituting relational changes of 
market integration? How does nature both enable and constrain capitalization of 
the space and production relations? 
2. How are the rules and conditions of production set in political struggles and 
reshaping rural power inequities? Who has the power to control and construct 
spaces and how is the space negotiated by different actors? 
3. How is market integration occurring? Is it bringing more or less regulation, 
outside control of resources, vulnerability, ecosystem degradation, and social 
rupture? 
 
In order to begin to understand the multiple processes, actors and relations at work, a 
holistic, interdisciplinary method is needed. The case of Caluya demonstrates the useful 
subtleties and complexities of political ecology as such an approach. In my study, 
political ecology helps to link detailed and local immersion learning with analysis of 
multiscalar processes keeping both power and materiality as central focuses. To this end, 
ethnographic methods offer rich and varied research data that can help pry open the 
multifaceted networks of explanation, breakdown stereotypical or totalizing discourses, 
and offer a deeper understanding. 
 
1.1 Methodology 
 
 This study focuses on Caluya Municipality, a small group of islands in Antique 
Province, Philippines. I stayed on four of the islands: Sibato, Sibolo, Panagatan, and 
Caluya Islands where I conducted ethnographic field work between May and September 
of 2007. Before leaving Canada, I made contact with Dr. Rodelio Subade at the 
University of the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV) located in Antique’s adjacent 
province, Iloilo. Dr. Subade generously provided me with working space at UPV and 
through a chain of contacts I identified Caluya as a seaweed cultivating area that had thus 
far not received much attention even though it produces much of the seaweed for the 
Western Visayas region, itself in the top five leading production areas in the Philippines.  
 I was initially introduced into the community by an independent municipal 
council member and was subsequently warmly hosted by four families, one on each 
island, for the duration of my stay. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 37 
seaweed planters ranging from 1.5 hours to multiple visits with some planters and 
families. All of these were conducted in the language most comfortable for the 
respondent in with the help of my research assistants. All were recorded, aside from six 
where notes were taken instead. Semi-structured interviews with six local seaweed 
intermediaries and buyers were also done. On Sibolo Island where the tourist 
development is most imminent, two focus groups were led by myself and my research 
assistant; one group of 6 women and one group of 6 men. I also interviewed 2 municipal  
agriculture officers and spoke to other members of the municipal zoning office and the 
Mayor. I made an effort to capture a range of opinions and experiences about seaweed 
cultivation and tourist development by trying to interview people and families from 
different backgrounds, social status, gender, income levels. Respondents were contacted 
through a snowball method and sought out as different themes developed. 
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 Interviews with representatives of the tourist development company and their 
local project manager were also conducted and I traveled to Cebu for a week to interview 
managers at 3 seaweed/carrageenan processing companies and to tour the facilities.  
 Invaluable as well were my everyday observations, casual conversations, 
participation in community events, and working with people on their seaweed and land 
crops. Information was also gleaned from municipal data, interactive mapping, 
government reports and websites, newspapers and unpublished research at UPV.  
 This type of ethnographic research presents its own challenges. Negotiating my 
positionality as foreign, white, woman from academia was one. The islands are difficult 
to travel to and receive very few visitors from outside the region, much less the 
Philippines. A handful of foreigners stop on one of island beaches every year on a day 
trip from other tourist resorts, but most people’s experience with researchers or 
Canadians is minimal to none. Assumptions about my status (especially in relation to my 
male research assistant), my income level, and my goals were continual points of 
discussion. This was exacerbated by the language barrier, which aside from a handful of 
people made direct conversation and explanation impossible. My choice of research 
assistants also made things interesting. My first research assistant was also from outside 
of the community and this was beneficial in some ways as we were not as attached to a 
particular set of family connections, but also made it difficult to delve into sensitive 
topics. My second research assistant was from the community and was, therefore, already 
positioned in a certain way within local power structures and conflicts, but due to various 
factors he was also able to bridge a number of status levels and familial connections. His 
help was invaluable in eliciting conversation about sensitive issues, figuring out complex 
family links and learning some of the local dialect. Conflictual and, at times, violent local 
politics, distrust between people and groups and social hierarchies all present challenges 
to understanding people’s responses and actions. As well, I feel that it is important to 
keep in mind that variations in individual motivations, decisions, and practices makes 
generalization difficult, though somewhat necessary for analysis and data presentation. 
Nonetheless, the heterogeneous nature of communities and families should not be 
forgotten. 
 
1.2 Organization of MRP 
 
 The bulk of this paper contextualizes and describes in detail Caluya’s experience 
with seaweed cultivation as a form of market integration. Concluding discussions 
describe and analyse the emergence of tourist development as a competing form of 
market integration here. I then use this comparison to draw connections between this 
specific case study and broader lessons that may be taken away from it about rural 
change and integration into global markets.  
 Section 2 sets out the main body of academic literature and theory I have drawn 
on to shape the focus of my analysis: political ecology. Section 3 contextualizes seaweed 
cultivation in Caluya within the scope of Philippines development policy especially in 
respect to rural poverty and aquaculture. This chapter includes an overview of the 
seaweed/carrageenan industry historically and in the Philippines. Section 4 dsecribes 
Caluya’s local context. My empirical research about seaweed cultivation in Caluya is 
covered in section 5. Section 6 moves on to discuss how seaweed is a unique cash crop 
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and why the social structure of Caluya has been able to assimilate it positively. There, I 
also discuss the vulnerabilities of the sector here that have opened seaweed cultivation to 
competition from tourism development. Section 7 contextualizes and describes the 
tourism development plan comparing its market processes with that of seaweed 
cultivation. In conclusion, section 8 returns to further discussion of what can be drawn 
from the islands experiences with market integration and agrarian change. 
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2. Theoretical Framework: Political Ecology 
  
 Understanding how Caluya’s socionature relations have been affected by 
processes of integration into global, regional, and national markets for 
seaweed/carrageenan and tourism requires looking at complex range of processes 
involving farmers, traders, seaweed, global capital, processors and the marine ecosystem, 
among others. Rather than the neo-classical economic viewpoint that sees globalization 
of markets as timeless and spaceless (Castree 1997), an analytical approach is called for 
that “will allow us to appreciate more fully the importance of diversity, agency, and local 
context, while incorporating the significance of broader structural forces” (Grossman 
1998, p18); an approach that also allows us to take seriously the productive forces of the 
non-human in shaping Caluya’s transition. It is to political ecology that I have turned for 
inspiration.  
 Integration into capitalist markets is often portrayed as either apolitical and 
inherently beneficial for the poor by its supports or, conversely, as necessarily harmful 
and marginalizing by its detractors. Political ecology can help to reveal more complex 
and contingent experiences than are portrayed by such “theory-driven polemic[s] that 
forces us into ‘taking sides’ on an issue that is more than two dimensional” (Barrett 2001, 
p31. Through this framework, attention can be brought to the specific networks formed 
and reformed between human and non-human actors, spaces and places by various 
processes. As Goodman (2001) argues, “this attention to how ‘socionatures’ are 
constructed broadens critical engagement with capitalist political economy, and our 
understanding of the heterogeneous associations which thrive under this ordering of the 
socioecological” (p195). Two such ‘heterogeneous associations’ are at work in Caluya 
and are examples of globalised capitals’ reach into previously peripheral spaces. Before 
turning to the specific strands of political ecology that have helped frame my analysis, I 
begin below with a brief overview of the literature.  
 
 Political ecology is a wide ranging field with multiple strands of inquiry and 
indeed, has been criticized for its apparent lack of coherence (Vayda & Walters 1999). I 
cannot assume to provide an overview of the entire field here, but I will draw on those 
authors who insist that political ecology is still “useful and lively” (Page 2003, p357) to 
trace the evolution of the field as well as some of the core concerns that underlie today’s 
political ecology and inform my methodology.  
 The roots of political ecology have been reviewed by a number of authors that I 
refer to here (Goldman 2000; Grossman 1998; Page 2003; Paulson 2005; Robbins 2004; 
Walker 2005; Zimmerer 2003). Though work, such as Thompson (1975) is often claimed 
by political ecology, the first use of the term is traced back to Wolf (1972) and it is 
generally seen to have emerged from the 1970s work of cultural ecology (Grossman 
1998; Robbins 2004). Cultural ecology looks at the way humans adapt to environmental 
change and focuses on the close study of people’s beliefs and behaviours to analyse 
human-environment relations (Grossman 1998; Walker 2005). Emerging from this type 
of localized study, early political ecologists strove to link the human-environment 
relations at the local level to broader forces of political economy. Most still point to 
Blaikie and Brookfield’s Land Degradation and Society (1987) as offering the first 
widely used definition of the field: “The phrase ‘political ecology’ combines concerns of 
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ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the 
constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within 
classes and groups within society itself” (p17). This attempt to insert the political into 
studies of the environment does not just look at the formal political sphere, but also how 
power is exerted through a range of spheres including control of land, labour, ideas, 
resources, rules or conditions of production (Page 2003; Robbins 2004).  
 Work that grew out of this definition specifically strove to critique apolitical 
ecology and Malthusian views of environmental degradation. These critiques continue to 
be common and important themes in political ecology (Robbins 2004). The research is 
explicit in its insistence that socionatural changes are political processes. Proximate 
causes cited as reasons behind environmental degradations, such as poverty and 
population are not the ultimate causes but are a manifestation of broader political and 
economic forces and conflicts (Bryant 1997; Gezon 2005). Especially in the analysis of 
environmental problems many, though not all, political ecology studies are committed to 
an account that link such issues to the logic of economic development under the rubric of 
a globalised capitalist system  (Bryant 1997; Walker 2005). This emphasis on the global 
political economy is still strong today, more recently focusing on the privatization and 
commodification of nature, a crucial accumulation strategy. Often portrayed apolitically 
as a poverty alleviation method, political ecologists have problematized this 
representation, questioning how power operates through the process and what inequalities 
are created by such privatization (Mansfield 2007). At the centre of my own study are 
questions about who benefits from enclosure attempts and how privatization is pursued 
through political struggle.  
 The structural focus of the 1980s though influential still was critiqued in the 
1990s as too deterministic (Goldman & Schurman 2000; Robbins 2004; Walker 2005). 
There was a call for more attention to the everyday politics of human-environment 
change and a return to localized, grounded studies that drew inspiration from peasant 
studies, itself a transdisciplinary field made up of rural sociologists, anthropologists, 
agriculture economists, geographers and political scientists (Robbins 2004).  Throughout 
the 1990s the emphasis on localized study continued, as it does today, reflecting another 
common theme running through political ecology research: that macro-level analysis is 
insufficient to understand the heterogenous formulations and responses to socionature 
changes. It is the exploration of complex, interconnected and dialectic factors that 
contextualize socionatural changes in a “processual web” which gives political ecology 
work such rich and varied content (Gardner 2005, p91). 
 Reemphasis on the local, though, also ran the risk of ‘romanticizing the peasant’ 
and beginning in the 1990s, a healthy corrective dose of influences from varying fields 
helped shape the political ecology of today (Goldman & Schurman 2000; Grossman 
1998; Page 2003; Robbins 2004; Walker  2005). Gender studies emphasized that gender 
relations are fundamental to understanding resource use, access, power differentials and 
environmental meanings. Social groups are by no means homogenous and intragroup 
conflict and variations in perceptions and beliefs create specific patterns of inequality and 
individual creativity that must be recognized (Goldman & Schurman 2000; Grossman 
1998). The discursive construction of environmental meaning and their constitutive 
forces also gained prominence at this time, asking how specific ideas about society and 
nature constrain or enable what is seen to be true and possible (Robbins 2004). Peluso’s 
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(1992) study of struggles over the Indonesian forests is a key text in this area. As well, 
eco-Marxism, science studies, social movement studies and post-colonial theory all have 
strong influences on political ecology today.  
 Of the core themes in the political ecology field today, three have shaped my 
research analysis and I will focus on these below: the “lively materiality of nature” 
(Goodman 2001), the relationship between local and extra-local forces, and the centrality 
of power. 
 
2.1 Materiality 
 
 While the role of the environment has always been central in political ecology, 
some have argued that the field has strayed too far from its ecological roots and is now 
primarily a study of the politics of the environment without enough engagement with 
biophysical ecology (Vayda & Walters 1999; Zimmerer & Bassett 2003). The 
environment, they argue, is more than a “malleable entity molded by human activity; 
rather, it has significance” (Grossman, quoted in Robbins 2004, p140). The human 
influences on the environment are important to consider, but there also needs to be 
recognition of the biophysical variables themselves and how they, in turn, shape 
socionature relations. In fact, there has been a turn recently to retheorize how ‘matter 
matters’ more generally in the critical social sciences and this is reflected also in political 
ecology (Bakker & Bridge 2006; Castree 1995; Walker 2005). Engaging with materiality 
is, I feel, critical in understanding how capital is producing nature in its desired image in 
Caluya, and conversely, how nature is shaping the opportunities for and outcomes of 
market integration there. As Grossman (1998) argues, materiality is particularly 
important for studies about agrarian change. 
  The “environmental rootedness” of agriculture, he contends, has significance for 
understanding agency in farming, the ability of the state or industry to control labour, 
patterns of resource use and inequality. Goodman (2001) asserts that, agro-food studies 
must begin to wrestle with “the liveliness of nature, its relational properties…in the eco-
social co-productions of agro-food networks” (p183). In essence, what is the difference 
that materiality, both biotic (human and non-human) and abiotic, makes? “Not just in its 
generalized form but as a highly variegated and complex set of entities and processes” 
(Sneddon 2007, p168). While I cannot do justice here to the current theoretical debates 
around materiality, a few key points are elaborated below. These are most relevant in 
political ecology’s effort to “articulate the natural as constitutive of the social, and vice 
versa, [and unpack] these relations for a better understanding of the political, ecological, 
and cultural” (Goldman & Schurman 2000, p568). 
 At the heart of the socionature debate are efforts to challenge the modern 
ontology that creates a dualistic separation of society and nature. Nature is portrayed as 
external and ‘revealed’ through science as being ‘useful’ to humans (Bakker & Bridge 
2006; Goodman 1999). As Castree laments, there has been such concern with theorizing 
how capitalism transforms nature and produces environments, that the importance of the 
bio-physical world has been overlooked as a force that shapes outcomes (Castree 1995. 
Recent work in agriculture and agro-biotechnologies have argued that natures cannot be 
fully molded, or ‘produced’ by capital (Boyd et al. 2001; Goodman & Schurman 2001; 
Bakker & Bridge 2006). Natures can be constrictive of such efforts by being 
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‘uncooperative’ (Bakker & Bridge 2006) or sources of surprise, dependency or 
opportunity (Boyd et al. 2001). “In short, we can, indeed must, recognize the fact that 
capitalism produces nature, but we must simultaneously recognize the materiality – and 
consequentiality – of the particular natures capitalism produces” (Castre 1995, p21). In 
these debates there is a fear expressed of returning to dualistic relationships or a form of 
environmental determinism. The fact that nature never speaks for itself but is produced or 
“cerned” (Castree 1995, p36) leaves many confounded by how to account for the socio-
economic production/construction of nature, “while simultaneously acknowledging the 
productive capacities of the non-human world” (Bakker & Bridge 2006, p11).  
 Bakker and Bridge (2006) argue for analysis that recognizes agency as 
decentralized away from being solely human in networks and seeks to “understand the 
processes through which socionatural networks are generated and maintained” (p19). 
Such a version of political ecology is one that makes an effort to undermine the social-
nature dichotomy by focusing on the mutually constitutive relations that include both 
biophysical materiality and cultural representations of ‘nature’ (Page 2003, p360). This 
type of political ecology must take ecology, the interrelations between biotic and abiotic, 
seriously. My research on seaweed reveals that complexes made up of non-humans, such 
as fish, ocean substrate, weather, salinity, seaweed, are just as multifaceted as the 
concurrent social networks: the ‘natural’ is deeply embedded in the ‘social’ and vice 
versa. Interrogating the hyphen in socio-natural and its very real effects on actors on each 
side is the goal. It does not make sense, as Castree (1995) argues, to separate the two, 
thus, I choose to use the terms socionature, biophysical, biotic, or abiotic as consistently 
as possible in my work. Unfortunately, one of the main challenges to this new political 
ecology is the lack of vocabulary available to fully overcome the externalized nature-
society dichotomy.  
 
2.2 Power 
 
 Despite the difficulties and inevitable shortcomings in my efforts, it is important 
to tackle materiality because it influences how socionature relations proceed and many 
livelihoods and non-human survival relies on how these play out. As well, Sneddon 
(2007) argues that understanding the specific biopyhisical relationships that are 
transformed, sustained, or disrupted during accumulation is necessary to understand the 
conflict that so often follow environmental change (p186). Recognizing the inevitability 
of the construction of nature does not also imply “an acceptance of the inevitability of 
specific construction - of nature, of body, of self” (Bakker & Bridge 2006, emphasis in 
original, p19) nor does it suggest that all socionature constructions are inevitable, 
desirable or just (Robbins 2004). A research agenda that addresses the difference that 
material differences make helps to refute dominant claims about nature and society. For 
example, political ecology work on food security and draught have shown that scarcity or 
supply is seldom the root of the problem, rather there is an intersection of multiple 
socionatural factors such as weather patterns, political decisions, demand, scientific 
knowledge, economic restructuring of supply, etc (Bakker & Bridge 2006). Indeed, 
struggles in Caluya are not merely due to finite space, but are about who has the power to 
control the space available and decide its use value. Understanding power is a central 
focus of political ecology. Socionatural changes have uneven consequences for different 
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actors. For example, while resource use may be ecological degrading and socially 
devastating for some, it may mean profitability for others (Ferguson 2005). The actions 
of some carry more weight than others and socionature systems are built upon a series of 
highly unequal power relations. It is an acknowledgment of the material embeddedness of 
social action. “In other words”, argues Bakker & Bridge (2006), “this work tries to do for 
the biophysical world what Polanyi did for the social: that is, to show how conventional, 
contemporary understandings (eg, of processes such as globalization) rely on the 
abstraction – or disembedding – of concepts like ‘the economic’ from socionature” (p18). 
 
 
2.3 Interscalar Processes 
  
This is closely related to the insistence in political ecology work of focusing on 
the micro-level. The turn to the material also recognizes ‘place’ as material and the 
differences in places encountered through grounded research disrupt hegemonic notions 
of a flattened capitalist world. The specificities of place are “creative forces” that shape 
the relations between, for example, seaweed production and food production or 
processing and transportation. Global, or extra-local flows, are embedded within 
localized biophysical, political, historical processes that are a dimension of the co-
relations between places and scales (Gezon & Paulson 2005). The local is not seen as 
acted upon or as a passive recipient of global markets. Rather, without overexaggerating 
the relative power of actors, there is a recognition that localized actors engage in ways 
that have extra-local effects. Studies such as Li’s (2002; see also Finnis 2006; Grossman 
1998) of cocoa farming show that decisions to enter markets cannot always be 
understood as outside pressure from landowners, traders, corporations, but can be the 
initiative of enterprising individuals and families.  
 While diverse, political ecology suggests that specific networks of socionatural 
relations are by no means unique. Certain relational processes and inequities are repeated 
in different places. It is by clarifying how these relations are produced, maintained, and 
changed that claims about the particular may generate broader understandings. In 
particular, about conditions that are most likely to produce marginalization and 
degradation of socio-ecosystems and, conversely, those that produce sustainable market 
integration (Hart 2006; Robbins 2004). While social scientists are often wary of 
prescriptive efforts, and for good reasons, Robbins (2004) argues that it is through 
attention to relational linkages that such claims may be made valid (p142). Indeed, the 
past tendency by some social science fields to insist on waiting until socio-ecological 
consequences are already evident, limits research to an analysis of impacts (Ferguson 
2005) and negates their role in struggles for justice and equity; awareness of the “deep 
and complex” dynamics of unequal power and its affects “informs the dual commitment 
of political ecology to both understanding and action” (Gezon & Paulson 2005, p11).   
 The range of political ecology work cited throughout this paper have helped to 
direct my focus and offered a vocabulary to understand how Caluya’s political economic 
systems are embedded in ecological systems. The two systems are necessary and 
complementary components of my analysis. To separate the two would result in 
overlooking critical configurations that shape and condition outcomes of Caluya’s 
engagement with two very different market processes. This work has also offered tools to 
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set the processes in Caluya within broader networks of policies and markets that have 
power to shift socionatures in the locale. It reminds me that power is not just located in 
the formal political sphere, but flows unevenly between actors as they compete over 
resource control and is reflected on the ecology.  
 The broader context that Caluya’s market integration is set in emerges in the next 
section of the paper. 
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3. Development, Aquaculture and Seaweed in the Philippines 
 
 The Philippines is regarded as one of the poorer nations in South East Asia, well 
behind Malaysia and Thailand in income per capita, and with larger income inequality 
than Indonesia (Irz et al. 2006). In terms of absolute poverty statistics, the National 
Statistics Office estimates that 37% of the population lives under the national poverty 
line. In 2006, a family of five in the Philippines needed a monthly income of 6, 274 PhP 
to meet their basic needs. This figure has risen 23% in the last three years alone 
(www.nscb.gov.ph). This sharp rise in income level needed can be traced to the rampant 
inflation of consumer prices in recent years, especially on basic commodities such as rice, 
corn, sugar, cooking oil and meat (NEDA 2004), that has accompanied the sharp 
devaluation of the peso. At the same time, household incomes have steadily declined in 
real terms since 1995 (Macabuac 2005). From the Marcos era on, the Philippines 
development strategies have accumulated massive debt that now stands at US $96 billion, 
claiming 5 pesos for every 10 pesos of income for debt repayment (Macabuac 2005). 
Unemployment is high, having tripled between 2002-2004, now comprising 10 million 
workers who are un- or underemployed (Macabuac 2005). 
 According to the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB), rural areas are 
disproportionately poor and the situation for coastal dwellers has been exacerbated by the 
degradation of marine resources (www.nscb.gov.ph). Fish catch by small-scale, 
municipal fishers has declined since the 1970s as coral reefs and seagrass beds have 
sustained heavy damage from industrial and tourist developments, mining, deforestation, 
aquaculture and illegal fishing (Rivera et al. 2002; Primavera 2006; La Vina 2001). 
While it was once easy for municipal fishers to net an average of 10kg of fish daily, they 
are now only coming home with 2kg a day (Escober 2006; Rivera et al. 2002). 85% of 
municipal waters are considered overfished and more the 400 kms of the country’s 
coastal areas are now heavily eroded, silted and sedimented (La Vina 2001). This decline 
in available marine resources as well as income and employment in the fisheries, is 
especially devastating for the Philippines where 55% of the population lives in coastal 
areas and at least 3 million people are employed (formally or informally) in the fishing 
and aquaculture sectors (Rivera et al. 2002).  
 In order to tackle the apparently persistent poverty of rural peoples and especially 
coastal populations, the Philippines government has been promoting the development and 
expansion of high-value, export-oriented aquaculture. This strategy is part of a broader 
national economic agenda that adheres to a neo-liberal framework, described by Kelly, as 
“faithful debt-servicing, reduced expenditure, deregulation and export-oriented 
development” (2000, 39). Kelly (2000) succinctly traces the shifting nature of this 
relationship from the pre-colonial period, through Hispanic colonialism (1521-1896), the 
American colonial period (1898-1946) and into the post-independence Philippines. He 
argues that the historical context of the Philippines is reflected in its contemporary, 
globally-focused economic policies. He does not, however, present a case of a country 
being shaped by external forces, but rather a picture of ongoing ‘hybridization’ of outside 
influences encountering a culturally complex society. The historical legacy left today, 
among other things, includes an economy geared towards export and an entrenched elite 
oligarchy now legitimized by democratic processes, but still benefiting disproportionately 
from land holdings and neo-liberal economic strategies (Kelly 2000). Philippines 
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economic policies are also encouraged by international financial institutions. In 1994, the 
World Bank praised the Philippines economy for being one of the “most deregulated” 
economies in Asia set to be economically recovered by 2000 (Macabuac 2005). As the 
previously cited statistics seem to demonstrate though, the fiscal measures imposed by 
international institutions and embraced by national elites, have not yet stemmed absolute 
and relative poverty in rural areas. Nonetheless, policies continue to stick closely to the 
same logic. Pursuit of increased tourist dollars and seaweed cultivation as a cash crop are 
only two current reflections of the Philippines’ effort to tap into global markets. 
 
3.1 Export-oriented aquaculture as development 
 
 In the coastal Philippines, global market integration through export 
aquaculture is increasingly evident as more communities become involved. Aquaculture 
has been touted as “The Blue Revolution”- a source of critically needed food security and 
a way to halt the drastic decline of worldwide marine stocks. In 2006, aquaculture 
accounted for 32 per cent of the global fishery supply and over 40 per cent of the world’s 
food fish supply compared to only 8% and 11%, respectively, in 1984 (Ahmed 2006; 
Barton & Stanifordt 1998). The global industry grew at a rate of 9 per cent a year 
between 1970-2002 with shrimp farming, in particular, seeing a huge boom in the mid-
eighties (Ahmed 2006). Although people throughout Asia have been farming fish and 
crustaceans for centuries, such extensive forms of aquaculture which have contributed to 
local food supplies are quickly being supplanted by input intensive, high productivity 
forms of aquaculture that cater to international markets (Flaherty & Vandergeest 1999). 
Primevra (2006) has shown that this shift from small-scale, family-owned aquaculture to 
a predominately corporate controlled, food extractive industry happened within the space 
of a decade.  
By 2002, 91% of the world’s farmed seafood was harvested in Asia and the vast 
majority of global seafood trade now consists of high value food fish flowing from the 
South to the North (Ahmed 2006; Primavera 2006). While poorer countries produce 85% 
of internationally traded fish products, industrial countries consume 40% of the world’s 
total fish supply (Macabuac 2005). The inequity of protein distribution mirrors global 
inequity with the richest fifth of the world now consuming nearly half of all meat and 
fish, leaving only 5% for the poorest fifth of the population (Macabuac 2005). Since the 
1980s, international financial institutions using rhetoric of poverty alleviation have 
promoted this boom in production and the aquaculture industry, for its part, makes every 
effort to frame the debate in scientific terms and easily defined export and job figures. 
Much of the traded fish products from aquaculture, states the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), are produced almost entirely in rural areas and “developing” 
countries and, “thus trade presents an opportunity to help rural communities” (FAO 2006, 
p28).  Moreover, “market failure is largely a consequence of poor governance, poverty, 
lack of resources and infrastructure” (FAO 2006, p29).  There exists explicit assumptions 
that trade is always good and that the market is the solution to everything if allowed to 
work ‘properly.’  The EU, also promotes preferential trade policies for certain third world 
exporters of fish products to help “increase export earnings, promote industrialization, 
[and] accelerate economic growth” (Ahmed 2006).  
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There is now a sizeable scholarship devoted to analyzing and documenting the 
impacts of export aquaculture. Much of this work focuses on highly socially and 
ecologically destructive sectors such as shrimp and salmon farming. I will only briefly 
touch on these impacts here. In terms of promised food security, researchers have found 
that such aquaculture actually has a net deficit of protein (Lebel 2002; Stonich & Bailey 
2000; EJF 2004; FAO 2006). High use of chemical inputs and antibiotics also 
characterizes intensive aquaculture as well as salinization of agricultural land and 
introduction of invasive species. Socionatural relations in intensive aquaculture areas can 
also be radically changed due to blocked access to coastal resources, the privatization and 
common lands and waterways, conversion of agricultural land, rural displacement and 
migration (Stonich & Bailey 2000; Primavera 2006). Human rights abuses, conflicts and 
violence have also been documented around high-value, export aquaculture operations 
(Stonich & Bailey 2000).  
Evidence for the benefits of aquaculture is mixed at best and the debate continues 
to rage about the economic and social benefits of aquaculture. Despite negative 
experiences with shrimp farming, researchers maintain that there are some benefits 
accruing to rural populations from aquaculture. While, employment of locals is often 
limited to low-paying, unskilled jobs, the income generated may help alleviate poverty. 
Production links both upstream and downstream of aquaculture farms create further 
employment. Extensive forms of aquaculture, rather than intensive, and farms that focus 
on herbivorous species, mollusks, and seaweed are less capital and input intensive, lower 
impact and create fewer barriers to entry for the rural poor (Escober 2006; Irz 2006). 
Thus far, there has been very little critical social science scholarship devoted to such 
aquaculture production. This is despite the fact that aquatic plants are the second largest 
global aquaculture product by volume (FAO 2006). Much of this volume is made up of 
edible seaweeds and represents a vast number of people involved and large areas of ocean 
devoted to it globally. The Philippines is one of the world’s largest contributors to this 
volume and now, after the bust of shrimp aquaculture, the Philippines government, has 
started to look towards other export aquaculture such as seaweed cultivation to fulfill its 
goals. Cultivated for processing and export, seaweed in the Philippines is part of global 
agri-food markets and, given the impact it is having on rural areas, it is important to 
explore whether it, too, follows the same patterns described above in other export 
aquaculture sectors. The following section describes the current government policies in 
the Philippines that support the seaweed sector. 
 
3.2 Current Aquaculture Policies 
 
Although incentives continue to flow from the government to shrimp farms, there 
has been recognition of the environmental impacts of intensive aquaculture by the 
Philippine government. The last decade has seen policy shift, at least on paper, from a 
resource maximization focus towards marine conservation (for a history of Philippines 
fisheries policies see, Escober 2006; Rivera et al. 2002). The two main policy tools 
governing the aquaculture sector are now the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization 
Act (AFMA) of 1997 and the more recent Aquaculture for Rural Development (ARD) 
program.  
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Both acts are characterized by arguably contradictory policies promoting a 
‘modernized, globally competitive’ aquaculture with principles of social equity, food 
security and resource conservation. The AFMA has focused on promoting 
public/partnerships to invest in technology and research necessary to increase 
productivity and trade of aquaculture in the face of declining capture fisheries (Escober 
2006). Such policies have had mixed results. In Aklan province, for example, the result 
has been a push to move small-fishers out of fishing as a way of life into pond workers or 
farmers (Rivera et al. 2002). As Rivera et al. argue (2002), the “government’s ‘safety net’ 
programs may be able to address livelihood problems at a local level, but they sidestep 
the question of whether trade itself is contributing to the crisis of the fishers” (p13). 
Perhaps at cross-purposes, the AFMA also requires the formation of community based 
fisheries management groups in every coastal barangay to address equitable sharing of 
resources. To date, while there are many on paper, very few of these groups have actually 
convened in reality (Rivera et al. 2002) and there is no evidence of one in Caluya. 
The government claims that the ARD is a departure from previous production-
oriented and technology-based policies and it is supposed to promote aquaculture with 
the following features: community based, simple environment-friendly technologies, low 
capital investment, and market focused (Escober 2006). Again, while this program looks 
good on paper, fisher groups, researchers and community organizations have criticized its 
implementation. They question the ARD’s stated goal of converting “wastelands” (which 
include swamps, sand dunes, sunken or flooded land, lahar-covered areas) into fishponds; 
the various fiscal and non fiscal incentives that continue to be given to medium and large-
scale operators of high-value products like shrimp; and the practice of ignoring 
environmental laws for expediency (Escober 2006). The process also continues to be top 
down and, as in the past, municipal fishers and coastal communities were not involved in 
developing the program goals even though they are the ones to bear the socio-
environmental cost. One of the largest undertakings from the program has been the 
establishment of mariculture parks, which are large areas of intensive fish cage 
operations. The goal has been to create employment and food fish, but because of the 
high capital investment needed most of the parks are owned by businesses while 
fisherfolk are instead employed as hired help. Of course, such employment boosts 
poverty statistics, but may not offer viable and stable livelihoods. As well, because of a 
lack of municipal resources to enforce good practice, unsustainable stocking and feeding 
practices may be repeated causing a repeat of past fish kills in the areas (Escober 2006). 
A clear problem that plagues Philippines fisheries and aquaculture management is 
fragmentation and contradiction. There are multiple agencies and government 
departments with overlapping responsibilities pursuing different policies in the same 
spaces. Even within laws there are contradictions, often a result of consensus with lobby 
groups. For example, in the Fisheries Code, waters from the shore to 15km are reserved 
for strictly municipal fishers and local users, but another section in the same document 
allows commercial fishers to start fishing 10km away from shore (Escober 2006). With 
increasing competition for coastal spaces between industry, fishers and gleaners, tourism, 
etc such fragmentation only serves to exacerbate conflicts. This fractious policy 
atmosphere is having profound effects on local areas.  
The government’s own Medium Term Philippines Development Plan recognizes 
institutional weakness in “a) continuing over-centralization, b) fragmented and 
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overlapping functions and activities, c) an inflexible commodity-based organizational 
structure, and d) a highly politicized, unstable and underequipped national bureaucracy” 
(NEDA 2004). It is one of the factors behind the struggle for coastal spaces in Caluya 
where two government-promoted sectors, aquaculture and tourism, have come into 
conflict. 
While many of the policies are still fashioned at the state level, they are to be 
implemented by local government units (LGUs) and this aspect of organization has 
proved to especially problematic since the devolution of powers from the national 
government to the LGUs in 1991. LGUs now have considerable control over 
environmental protection and fisheries resources, but are underfunded and lacking in 
expertise that has long been concentrated with the central government (La Vina 2001). 
The oligarchic and elite control of local government also has a major impact on coastal 
management. For example, community based management programs opposing 
environmentally damaging proposals and trying to create sustainable aquaculture often 
face significant barriers from LGU elites (La Vina 2001). Election turn over in LGUs also 
causes such initiatives to lose momentum, making it nearly impossible to establish 
socially equitable allocation as the norm (Rivera et al. 2002). 
The highly politicized situation at the local level in Caluya is certainly affecting 
livelihood choices and environmental changes there. Very few elites control the LGU and 
all environmental regulation and use policies are ultimately decided by them, therefore, 
local peoples’ affiliations and access to the powerful condition much in their lives. 
Despite such policy and power issues, aquaculture production in the Philippines 
still shows enormous growth (Figure 1). In 2004, it had an output gain of 17.9% 
compared to gains of only 2.43% in municipal fisheries and 1.86% in commercial 
fisheries (BAS 2004). Consistent growth in the industry is attributed to the seaweed 
sector, which contributed 71% of all aquaculture output by volume in 2005 and continues 
to grow (BAS 2005) (see Figure 2). Interestingly, despite continued overall growth, the 
FAO laments the fact that the Philippines has not maintained its global position in 
aquaculture, falling from 4th largest producer in 1985 to 12th leading producer today. “In 
this age of international trade and competition”, it counsels, the Philippine aquaculture 
industry needs to plan and implement a development and management programme with a 
global perspective” if it is to continue to bring foreign exchange earnings, provide 
employment and food security (FAO 2002). The seaweed industry must deserve high 
praise then, for it has not only continued to grow, by an average of 7% per year between 
1998 and 2002, but the Philippines remains globally competitive in this commodity, 
leading the world in carrageenan seaweed production (FAO 2002). 
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Figure 1. Reported aquaculture production by volume 
 in the Philippines, source FAO (2002) 
 
Figure 2. Per cent share of aquaculture volume by species 2005 
Source, Bureau of Agriculture Statistics 
 
 
 
3.3 Export Seaweed Cultivation in the Philippines 
 
 In contrast to other forms of aquaculture, seaweed has been praised as clearly a 
pro-poor option for coastal populations. Seaweed farming is characterized as “one of the 
most productive and environment friendly forms of livelihood among the coastal 
population” of the Philippines (BAS 2005). It is labour intensive and requires low capital 
inputs and “family labour is gainfully employed”  (Delmendo et al. 1992), thus making it 
an “appropriate livelihood for coastal fisherfolk” (Hurtado et al. 2001). “Infused with the 
proper modern technology”, argue some researchers, seaweed farming will help ease 
poverty in rural, coastal areas (Orogo 1994). 
 Even some of the most adamant critics of Philippines’ aquaculture see 
possibilities in its promotion. Primavera, a long time mangrove researcher and anti-
shrimp farm campaigner, argues that mangroves and aquaculture are not necessarily 
incompatible (Primavera 2006). Seaweeds can be grown amongst mangroves and such 
small-scale aquaculture is well suited for family-based, community managed 
conservation projects (Primavera 2006). In other export aquaculture and land crops the 
high costs of fertilizer and seeds or fry is prohibitive for small holder producers. The 
price for fertilizers in the Philippines is nearly double that of the world price due to 
corporate concentration (NEDA 2004). Since seaweed farming does not need fertilizers 
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or other high priced inputs, not only has it gained an environmentally-friendly reputation, 
its low capital costs make it accessible to rural small holders and its high productivity 
allow for a doubling or tripling of one’s initial investment in a matter of months 
(Blanchetti-Revelli 1995; Escober 2006). 
 In particular, the seaweed cultivation in the Philippines focuses on Eucheuma 
seaweed. The Philippines is now the number one producer of Eucheuma seaweeds, 
generating 72% of the world’s supply with approximately 58 000 hectares in cultivation 
(SIAP 2007). In 2005, the Philippines produced 1.3million MT of this type of seaweed 
(BAS 2005) and it is Eucheuma seaweeds that underpin the US $10 billion global 
carrageenan industry (Bryceson 2002). Carrageenan, is an essential component of global 
agri-food networks tied especially to the rise of processed food products. 
Carrageenan is a gelling agent that is used as an emulsifier, a binder, or for 
suspension and stabilization in a range of products. It is added to products either by itself 
or after being blended with other additives such as bean gums, sugars or calcium 
carbonate depending on what the product calls for. The list of products that carrageenan 
is used in is mind boggling. To name a few: 
 processed meat products – chicken nuggets, glazed ham, hotdogs, fish burgers 
 dairy – milk, ice cream, chocolate milk, canned coconut milk, mousse 
 breads and pastas, cake glazes 
 ketchup, dressings and other sauces 
 fruit juices and concentrates 
 dry and wet pet foods 
 toothpaste and shampoos 
 beer production 
 sugar cane processing 
 air freshener gel 
 laboratory gels  
 textile printing 
 medical supplies 
 pharmaceutical capsules, cough syrup 
 
The actual processing of carrageenan from dried seaweed is basically a process of 
washing, grinding, heating, dissolving in a mild alkali solution (this step is to clarify the 
gel and can be skipped for less refined carrageenan), filtration, drying again and again 
grinding the dried seaweed down until the desired level of refined powder is reached See 
Figure 3). There is nothing added to the final product nor are there any chemicals used in 
the processing. There are two basic types of carrageenan: kappa carrageenan derived 
from Eucheuma cotonii and iota carrageenan from Eucheuma spinosum.  
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Figure 3. Carrageenan Processing 
 
source: www.mcpicarrageenan.com 
 
 Carrageenan has been described as a ‘ghost’ commodity (Blanchetti-Revelli 
1995). It is a commodity that is little known to the general public despite the fact that it is 
increasingly found in our food. People do not commonly know it is in their food and if it 
is noticed on the ingredient list, there is no indication that it is derived from seaweed. It is 
an ‘invisible’ yet essential component of the increasingly global agro-food industry. As 
processed foods and spatially distant food systems have become the norm for the world’s 
middle classes, the global hunt for the needed raw materials has led to increasingly 
remote areas. Although, it is in high demand with a current undersupply in the market, 
companies cannot raise the price in the same way as other ‘visible’ commodities. 
Colloids that have similar properties can be substituted for many processes, therefore 
companies must feek a delicate balance between technical properties and costs 
(Blanchetti-Revelli 1997). Unlike, other highly visible commodities like shrimp, 
consumer demand does not have a strong influence on the market prices or, for that 
matter, on the continuation of people’s livelihoods who grow seaweed. The next best 
colloid may come along tomorrow and be substituted for carrageenan with little 
awareness by the end consumer. Despite this, the market price has risen slowly over the 
years and global demand for carrageenan has been steadily rising at a rate of 5-7 per cent 
per year for the last 15 years and is projected to continue grow (Hurtado et al 2001; also, 
interviews with processing companies).   
Since seaweed offers a niche in global competitiveness and is in demand, the 
Philippines government has decided to pursue an expansion of the seaweed industry. The 
Seaweed Development Program of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
(BFAR) was started in 1996 with three main focus areas: research and development, 
management, and institutional development (Ferrer 2006), though it was not until the last 
few years that the program started to make strides. A sub program has now been formed, 
the National Integrated Seaweed and Seaweed Products Development and Promotion 
Program, that is creating provincial and regional seaweed development councils with 
goals to increase the number of hectares farmed per year, and the creation of new 
processing plants and marketing opportunities (Ferrer 2006). 
 Many of the government intentions on paper, however, have been hindered by the 
afore mentioned issues of contradictory and fragmented government policies as well as 
inability or corruption at the local government level. In fact, throughout the industry’s 
history much of the expansion has been led by the private sector processing operations 
and university research projects. A fundamental turning point in the global colloid 
industry happened in the Philippines with the establishment of the seaweed cultivation. 
Previously the carageenan industry depended on seaweed gathered from the wild leaving 
it more susceptible to inconsistent supply and fluctuating prices (Blanchetti-Revelli 
1997).  The first seaweed farm was established jointly in 1969 by US based Marine 
Colloids Inc.(MCI) and  Professor Maxwell Doty, from the University of Hawaii. This 
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was in the southern Philippines province of Tawi-tawi (Ahmed 2006). Today MCPI 
(formerly a subsidiary of MCI, but now a wholly Filipino owned corporation) and SIAP, 
the Seaweed Industry Association of the Philippines, which represents many of the 
carrageenan Philippines processors have both been particularly active in starting 
demonstrations farms, finding new cultivation areas, and pushing for trade agreements at 
the international level. 
 It is important to remember that while seaweed cultivation differs in significant 
ways from other cash crops, it is still an export-oriented commodity and part of an 
international economic structure. The desire to capture foreign exchange earnings has 
been a motivating factor in the government support of this industry as in other extractive 
industries. As such, it is affected by currency fluctuations and disputes between 
international capital. Most recently the appreciation of the Philippine Peso (PhP) has had 
some exporters predicting huge decreases in profitability. Benson Dakay, president of 
Shemberg, the largest seaweed processor in the Philippines, and head of SIAP said his 
company could lose up to PhP 200 million in 2007 noting that the Philippines is now 
competing with cheaper raw material and labour in the Indonesian and Chinese industries 
(Cruz 2004). In a reflection on the lack of concrete actions, despite much paper success, 
Dakay has given up on asking for the government’s help in supporting the sector and 
protecting small farmers. "I think the exporters are no longer important to the 
government, with the $15 billion dollar remittances from the overseas Filipino workers. 
We (exporters) are now left on our own," Dakay argues. Instead, he said, the exporters 
would have to find ways to cut down production cost and increase efficiency to remain 
globally competitive. He also states that reducing farmgate prices might also be necessary 
(Cruz 2004). Like in other extractive industries, smallholders and local level socionatural 
relations are somewhat at the mercy of global financial vagaries and competition. 
 Lanfranco Blanchetti-Revelli’s work on the seaweed industry has shown that 
while this is true, at the same time, international capital is not hegemonic (Blanchetti-
Revelli 1997).  Actors are constantly renegotiating their position in the system. The 
colloid industry is essentially an oligopsony at the global level, with only a handful of 
players. However, without denying the exploitative nature of the modern world economy, 
he argues that their dominance has been neither fixed nor absolute. Antagonism between 
dominant interests, in fact, created vacuums where subordinate players were able to take 
advantage of their context and emerge as independent players at higher levels 
(Blanchetti-Revelli 1997). This led to the emergence of domestic processing in the 
Philippines and is a key reason seaweed farmers in the Philippines enjoy a higher degree 
of market stability and demand than farmers elsewhere in the world who sell directly the 
transnationals. 
   
3.4 Global Capital Conflict: From Canada to the Philippines 
 
 Brought to Canada by Irish settlers, the practice of ‘mossing’ (gathering wild Irish 
Moss seaweed) was once widespread in the Maritimes. When carrageenan rose to food 
processing fame during World War II, the mossing quickly became commercialized. 
Agar, also derived from a species of seaweed, was the popular colloid for food processing 
at the time, but Japan controlled nearly the whole supply (Blanchetti-Revelli 1995). 
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Research into carrageenan as a substitute for agar broke open the market and the demand 
for carrageenan has risen accordingly with the demand for processed foods.  
 Between 1948-1974 Canada was the world’s largest supplier of carrageenan 
seaweed and 5 processors controlled the market, 2 in the US, 2 in Denmark and 1 in 
France (Blanchetti-Revelli 1995). The market was characterized by high and rising 
demand, tight corporate control of prices, and ever decreasing wild stocks. Over the years 
‘mossers’ were forced to invest in ever more expensive technology to reach seaweed beds 
further and further afield, but the corporate prices were not increasing at the same rate. 
Corporations began to scout the world seas in order to diversify their seaweed sources. At 
the same time they invested in research on seaweed ecology (Blanchetti-Revelli 1995). 
The possibility of cultivation offered a solution to the instability of raw material supply 
and, finally, to the detriment of Canadian seaweed harvesters, the ideal place was found 
in the Southern Philippines. A native Eucheuma seaweed grew there which produced 
quality carrageenan and ecological conditions made cultivation possible. It was a web of 
economic, poltical and socionatural factors that facilitated the shift from Canadian 
dominance in production to the Philippines becoming the world’s supplier.  
 Canadian coasts are not suited to cultivation of seaweed. So while Canadian 
mossers were limited by supply and technology, the production process of seaweed 
cultivation favoured small holders and spread like wild fire when introduced in the 
Philippines (Blanchetti-Revelli 1995). The lower cost of labour in the Philippines relative 
to Canada also attracted the companies to shift their buying there. Although initially the 
same corporations that controlled the Canadian market, tried to control the production in 
the Philippines through plantation style seaweed farms, they could not compete with 
small, family run farms (Blanchetti-Revelli 1995). This is due to the flexibility of labour 
needed for seaweed farming and the difficulty of controlling the seedlings and 
technology. The labour for seaweed cultivation must be highly flexible to work on the 
cyclical time scales of tides and the moon, making it difficult to pay workers stable 
wages. It is assimilated easily into diverse and adaptable labour patterns of small holders. 
Since seaweed is grown from cuttings, it is almost impossible for agri-businesses to 
control the needed inputs in this way. This, combined with low capital and technology 
needs for entry, allowed seaweed cultivation to spread rapidly in the Philippines and 
control of production was seized from corporate interests. These important characteristics 
that make seaweed a unique cash crop will be further explored in the context of Caluya 
Island in Section 6 of this paper. 
 The shift from Canadian to Filipino production demonstrates the mutual 
constitution of local and extra local processes in global markets and reveals the interplay 
of multiple factors: world agro-food markets, biophysical properties of seaweed, 
livelihood strategies, international finance conflict and so on. The Philippines processing 
and export sector has continued to grow, now boasting close to 30 companies some of 
which are joint ventures while others are wholly Philippines owned.  
As Kelly (1997) argues, global market integration is not new to the Philippines 
and has become a central tenet of its economic policy in the form of commodity exports, 
foreign investment, and the exportation of its own people as migrant labour. Indeed, in 
order to begin to understand seaweed farming not only nationally in the Philippines, but 
in the specific locale of the Caluya Islands the relationship between the local and 
extralocal scales and processes must be seen as interwoven and fluid. Decisions and 
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outcomes need to be, as Li argues in another context, “grasped historically as the product 
of transnational pressures, regional processes of class formation, and particular localized 
constellations of power” (2002, p417). Local realities of people engaged in growing 
export crops are not simple “epiphenomena of global processes (Blanchetti-Revelli 1997, 
p6). Nor are global realities a dominance that is unchallenged and fixed, devoid of the 
‘messiness’ of ecosocial relations. Lagendijk (2004) makes a very clear argument that no 
economy can escape local reality because it is only through the local that economic 
relations are materialized. The next section turns now to the local context of my study: 
the Caluya Islands. 
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4. Research Context: Caluya Islands 
 
 Caluya is an island municipality in the province of Antique (Map 1). It lies 
between the islands of Mindoro and Panay, about 4-5 hours by ferry from both of them.1 
“The furthest and last town of the province” (Municipal Development Plan), Caluya is 
not well known outside the area and often gets left out of statistics and maps of the 
province, despite having a sizable population of more than 20 000 (NSO 2000).  The 
most likely reason people know of Caluya is because the island of Semirara is home to 
the largest coal mine in South East Asia.2  Seaweed has not put it on the map, even 
though Caluya produces a sizeable amount of seaweed relative to its population. This is 
not surprising as most people, even in the Philippines, have little exposure to seaweed 
farming.  
 Aside from Semirara Island, whose economy revolves around the coal mine, 
livelihoods in Caluya include: subsistence farming and fishing; cash cropping of copra, 
nipa, some vegetables and seaweed; commercial fishing; wage labour for seaweed 
buyers, fishing boats, and construction; work at the municipal hall on Caluya Island; mat 
weaving; entrepreneurial businesses such as sari-sari shops, tricycle driving (only on 
Caluya Island); teaching at the high school, newly opened college or one of the 
elementary schools; and midwifery. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list and many 
people supplement their main income with trades such as carpentry, boat building, 
sewing, etc.  
 Most people who live in coastal barangays of the municipality are involved in the 
seaweed industry, either growing it full or part time, buying and trading it, or working as 
labourers. The provincial data show that about 38 per cent of the population are 14 and 
under. Therefore, the 2500 full time seaweed planters makeup about 27 per cent of the 
adult population outside Semirara.3 Again, even this high percentage does not include the 
many families who farm part time or who otherwise gain income from the seaweed 
industry (boat transport, labour, collecting and drying seaweed that breaks free, buying 
and trading). It seems as though almost everyone you meet is somehow involved with 
seaweed and it clearly plays a central role in the islands’ economy and socionatural 
relations. Even children are involved with helping on their family’s seaweed plots and 
collecting their own bags of seaweed that has been washed up on shore and selling it for 
pesos. 
                                                 
1 Although the islands are often labeled on maps as Semirara Islands, I will be referring 
to the group as Caluya Islands as they are more commonly known to residents and in 
nearby municipalities.  
2 While most things about the company’s operation there are kept quiet with the help of 
armed guards and information blackouts, it has been in the news recently. Community 
opposition in Antique stopped a plan to fill old coal pits with garbage shipped from 
Manila. 
3 Not only is Caluya spatially remote, it seems to be ‘statistically’ marginalized. There are 
very few data sets available for the area. Data about local production, planters, etc 
throughout the paper is derived from my own detailed collection of numbers and 
harvesting detail from planters, local buyers, and the Cebu processors.  
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 My own research concentrated on the main seaweed farming areas: Sibato Island 
and adjacent Imba barangay, Sibolo Island, and the Panagatan cays (see Map 1 for 
general seaweed areas). Since Sibato and Sibolo differ in important ways from 
Panagatan, I will treat them separately in my analysis and descriptions.  
 
4.1 Sibato and Sibolo Islands 
 
 Although separated by an hour and a half pump boat ride, Sibato and Sibolo share 
many similarities. Maps 2 and 3 show the land use and seaweed areas for each island. 
Both islands have an upland mixed agricultural area where families have plots of land. 
The islands also have rocky land in parts and cliffs that restrict suitable seaweed sites. 
Map 3 of Sibato also shows Imba barangay across the pass which shares kin relations. 
Seaweed areas stretch between the two islands. Well-kept houses line the few sand roads 
that skirt the shores of the island (Figures 4 and 5). The house construction materials vary 
with a handful fully concrete, most mixed concrete and wood/nipa, and many nipa/thatch 
houses; about half have aluminum roofs. 
 
.        
Fig. 4 A mixed material house 
on Sibolo Island. 
Fig. 5 A nipa house on Sibato 
Island.
 
 
Houses generally have a small yard area surrounding the house or shared between 
groupings of houses where people do laundry, dry and tie seaweed, have flower gardens, 
have outdoor cooking and eating areas, and in a few cases have CRs (toilets are known as 
‘comfort rooms’, these are concrete outhouses with squat toilets and water buckets). 
There is no electricity on the islands and no piped water. Sibato has a barangay generator 
that connects those houses close to it for 120 pesos per month. It runs on sporadic 
evenings from about 6pm to 9pm. On both islands, a couple of families also have their 
own generators, which they will run when they want to watch TV or charge cell phones. 
There are only two or three TVs on each island and when they are on, it is common to 
find many neighbours crowded around the set to watch as well. Sibolo also boasts a 
videoke set owned by the main seaweed buyer and is an attraction during the good 
seaweed season when people have more money. 
 Much time is spent, when not working, around the plazas where there is pickup 
basketball nightly from about 5 to 7 (Figure 6). Children congregate here to play after 
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school as well. Each island also has certain houses or beach huts where groups are often 
found chatting, taking care of young children and resting after working. Gatherings of the 
whole community or certain kin networks are frequent occurrences on the islands and 
usually include food sharing. Such events include the 
annual fiesta, other festival or saint days, birthday 
parties, wakes, weddings, and holidays.  
 Each island has an elementary school, grades 
one to six, split into three classes. The schools are in 
disrepair and the teachers have very few resources 
and very little funding, but there are increasing 
attendance rates since seaweed planting became the 
norm and families have money for high school and 
college. The school on Sibato, was build by the 
residents with donated labour and materials when it 
was apparent that the municipal government was not 
going to provide one. For high school, children must 
board on Caluya or Semirara during the school week. 
There is no health clinic on either island and people 
rely on the clinic on Caluya Island, which is lacking 
essential equipment and medicine. The doctor actually lives on Mindoro and is very 
rarely in town and the two midwives who run the clinic have very little at their disposal. 
A common complaint voiced during interviews about the clinic was a lack of any 
medicines other than asprin. Public health nurses do come to Sibolo to immunize children 
every few months, while Sibato residents are expected to go to Caluya, only a 15 minute 
pump boat ride away. For serious medical concerns residents must travel to Mindoro, a 
five hour, 400 peso boat ride away. Often it is too late before people decide the illness is 
serious enough to make the trip and such an unscheduled trip is expensive for residents. 
The cemeteries on the islands attest to the high childhood mortality rates documented in 
the Municipal Development Plan; most families have lost a child, mainly to preventable 
diseases.  
Fig. 6 Pick up basketball; youth first 
then the older men. Notice the seaweed 
drying in the foreground on the court. 
 Child mortality is also due to the lack of drinking water, especially on Sibolo. On 
Sibato there is a community deep well that is safe for adults to 
drink (babies and young children need to have the water 
boiled until they build up an immunity, bottled water is also 
sold in the sari sari stores). Again, this necessity was not 
provided by the government, but was dug by a family and 
paid for with their seaweed earnings. People walk up the hill, 
10-15 minutes to fetch water daily and to wash in fresh water 
or they can have water delivered by water buffalo for 10 pesos
per 30 gallon jug (Figure 7). There are a couple other wells 
the island, but the water is salted and only used for laundry 
and washing. On Sibolo, there is no fresh water available. 
They have salted wells, which they use for cooking, laundry
and washing, but their drinking water is collected rain water 
when they are lucky, or brought by boat from Caluya or 
Sibato for 25 pesos per 30 gallon jug. One of the sari sari 
Fig.7 Water delivery, Sibato 
Island 
 
on 
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stores now sells bottled water as well. Garbage is usually burnt and propane stoves or 
wood is used for cooking.  
 The residents of these two islands all share the same kin relations. There are 10 
original settler families (some older folks estimate that families came from Palawan and 
Panay in the mid 19th century) and a few other families who are considered the original 
inhabitants. 10 surnames account for almost all residents and they own almost all the land 
on the islands and have complex intermarriage webs of relations. Sibato has 
approximately 120 households and Sibolo has approximately 140 with populations of 
about 600 and 800 respectively.  
 Every household on the islands, with the exception of a couple of fishing families, 
plant seaweed as their main income often with 2 or 3 people in the household (for 
example both the husband and wife and older children) each planting their own area. 
Inland from the coastal strips of housing on both islands is the ‘bukid’, a large upland 
area consisting of forest, planted trees and crops, and coconut farms.  Households have 
access to plots of land and maintain food crops for consumption or trading, such as corn, 
cassava, dry rice, melons, squash, cucumber, fruit trees. Many also fish and glean other 
marine resources for consumption and keep chickens, a pig, or a goat. Sari sari stores run 
by seaweed buyers also sell canned and dried food items and other sundry.  
 By all accounts, though still lacking in some basic necessities, the standard of 
living on the islands has risen dramatically since people here took up seaweed planting in 
the early 1990s. 
 
4.2 Panagatan Cays 
 
 The three small islands that make up Panagatan (Uno, Dos and Tres), unlike 
Sibato and Sibolo, have been settled only recently with the first families coming to plant 
seaweed in 1986 (Map 4). It is a coral atoll with islets that are rocky volcanic mounds, 
sandy in parts with a few remaining trees and some mangrove cover. The large shallow 
area between the islets has a coral and seagrass bottom and offers perfect conditions for 
seaweed planting. The entire population, of about 1500 people, has moved there to plant 
seaweed. 
 The original settlers actually used sledgehammers to break down the sharp rock 
and level areas for housing. Compared 
with Sibato and Sibolo the scene is 
chaotic. Houses are arranged haphazardly 
and most are flimsy looking buildings 
(Figure 8). Most people here have larger 
seaweed areas than those on Sibato and 
Sibolo and, subsequently, make more 
money, but since they only live on 
Panagatan temporarily the standard of 
living is not as easily read from the 
landscape. There are a handful of families 
who have made their permanent home 
there and have concrete houses, but most 
Fig. 9 A view of the more haphazard and rocky 
setting on Panagatan Uno. 
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families’ gains from seaweed wealth are not visible here. Instead they are investing in 
building concrete houses in the home communities and investing in businesses there. 
 People have come from all over the Philippines to plant here. Migration and 
settlement arrangements are still governed by kin relations as they are on Sibato and 
Sibolo, only with a much larger spatial reach. The social networks and housing clusters of 
the island are arranged generally around place of origin (see Map 4). There are many 
people from inland barangays of Caluya Island who plant here and travel back and forth. 
There is a large portion of the population from Cebu some of whom planted seaweed 
there before, but were enticed to Panagatan by better waters, and many of whom gave up 
lucrative, but dangerous, compression fishing work there. There are also more recent 
settlers from Semirara island whose seaweed areas there have been damaged by pollution 
from the coal mine, as well as people from Mindoro, Panay, Zamboanga, and Manila. 
The transient nature of the island creates a much different social scene than elsewhere in 
Caluya. Although there are whole families living together and planting seaweed, there are 
many people who have come temporarily without their family to plant, especially single 
males. This gives a different feel to the island – more of a work hard, play hard type of 
atmosphere. There are a few privately owned generators on the island offering TV and 
videoke, which is especially popular combined with drinking and gambling at night since 
there is really nothing to do but plant seaweed and there is a large amount of cash floating 
around on the islands. There are no banks in Caluya. The nearest banking facilities are in 
San Jose, Mindoro so there are vast amounts of cash on all the islands since seaweed 
planting started. This has reportedly led to some conflicts and robberies, but a more wide 
spread problem is a lack of money management skills. Some people amass quite a bit a 
wealth in the good growing season and have difficulty saving it in the atmosphere on 
Panagatan. Those who have people to send it to or who have students to invest in tend to 
do better. 
 There is no agriculture on the island, food is sold at the main store on the island 
owned by Mrs.Belloria, the biggest seaweed buyer in Caluya. She now lives on Panay, 
but regularly supplies the store with food and goods from Manila and Mindoro. There is 
also a baker’s oven and one of her employees makes fresh bread and baked goods every 
few days. Like Sibolo, there is also no fresh water on the islands for drinking and only a 
couple of areas where people can draw brackish water for washing. Water is brought in 
from Caluya in large jugs for 30 pesos per 30 gallons. This water is also slightly salted 
because the jugs are dragged behind the boats for the one and a half hour boat ride, 
though bottled water can be bought at the store. Thus, hygiene and water related diseases 
are problematic on the islands especially for the young children.  
 There was a one-room elementary school on the island, but it has been closed for 
the last year after a political dispute between some residents and the barangay captain 
(Panagatan is part of a barangay on Sibay Island). The teacher was pulled out by the 
municipality and many people feel they are being punished for not supporting the correct 
candidate in the local elections. Most families send their children back home for 
schooling or to board on Caluya. Those children who remain on the island have not been 
able to attend school, but there is widespread hope that the new mayor will reopen the 
school. There is no health care on the island. 
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4.4 Local Government Structure 
 
 Caluya is a municipality and as such, has municipal hall located on Caluya Island 
that houses the various government departments. The municipal government, or Local 
Government Unit (LGU), is composed of a mayor, vice mayor and 8 councilors, who 
along with the youth council form the Sangguniang Bayan, or municipal council. All are 
elected for terms of three years and cannot serve more than three consecutive terms. The 
mayor holds considerable power and can veto legislation put forth by the council. This 
veto can be overridden by a 2/3 majority vote on the council. Since the devolution of 
powers to the LGUs, the municipalities now have the power to enact local policies and 
laws and enforce them (Rivera et al. 2002). In general, Philippines’ politics has been 
characterized as oligarchic with only 134 families controlling the nation’s congress over 
the past century (Macabuac, M 2005). Frequent accusations of crony capitalism circulate 
as well as reports of corruption and abuse of public resources for private gain  (Macabuac 
2005). 
 Caluya has not escaped the scandals of politics. Two families have dominated 
local politics for almost 40 years and the most recent elections in May 2007 were fraught 
with tension and accusations. RJ Lim, whose brother held the mayor’s post for almost 20 
years during the time of Marcos, retook the mayor’s seat for his family from the 
Frangue’s, a husband and wife team who have been mayor, one after the other, for 15 
years. His victory was not without contention though. Vote buying and fraud accusations 
put the decision on hold and the new mayor was not inaugurated until July 1 2007. This 
shift in power has been cause for much speculation and hope on the islands that 
municipal services will improve. It has also resulted in many civil servants at the 
municipal hall losing their jobs and being replaced by Lim’s supporters. The power 
struggles at work in the municipality have direct consequences for people who anxiously 
awaiting news of shifts in policy, new mayor’s permits to pay for and decisions about 
zoning. Currently people are awaiting word about zoning changes to allow for tourism. 
The Frangue’s have already rented their land to the development company and the ex-
mayor reportedly used his last few weeks in office to open policy towards tourism. The 
Lim family is also thought to be involved in development plans with the company. 
 The smallest level of government in the Philippines is the barangay. It consists of 
a neighbourhood of about 100 families and is governed by an elected council of 8 
barangay officials, or kagawads, and the barangay captain (BC) who are in charge of 
various committees such as peace and order, or sports. As well there is a barangay 
treasurer and barangay secretary, which are appointed by the council. Each of these 
positions comes with a part-time salary. The barangay officials play important roles in 
people’s lives in Caluya, resolving disputes and influencing families’ access to resources 
and services. The next section moves forward to present my empirical findings about 
seaweed cultivation in Caluya. 
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5. Seaweed Cultivation in Caluya Islands 
 
 
 The first sac of seaweed was brought to Caluya in 1986 by a local fisher who had 
observed it being grown in Palawan. He learnt the technique from friends there and 
decided to invest in a sac of seedlings and materials from them becoming the first 
seaweed entrepreneur in Caluya. His seaweed farm flourished and the technology spread 
quickly through friends and family. He went on to become the first seaweed buyer in the 
area, selling directly to the Cebu buyers on their way to and from Palawan. By the early 
1990s seaweed planting as a livelihood had expanded to all coastal barangays where 
conditions are suitable. The spread of seaweed farming still continues in much the same 
way today. Word of mouth about the opportunity and help to start out is through kin 
relations and there are always new entrepreneurs looking for a chance to start their own 
seaweed farm.  Statistics about seaweed production in Caluya are few and far between, 
though the main Cebu buyer estimates that it produces much of the volume for the 
Western Viasayas, which is the fifth largest producer in the Philippines (BAS 2005) at 
about 55 000 MT annually. I have estimated annual production totals for Caluya based on 
my interviews with three of the area’s buyers, data from Cebu companies and harvest 
data from planters. The annual volume produced is approximately 11 000 MT of dry 
seaweed. 
 
5.1 ‘How to’ Guide to Seaweed Planting 
 
Seaweed cultivation takes place in ocean waters that are relatively sheltered. Ideally, the 
bottom should be firm sand with patches of coral or a good growth of seagrass. At low 
tide the area to be planted should be about half to 1 meter in depth and at high tide no 
deeper than 4-5 meters. In the case, of the Caluaya, each 
island has a large shallow area protected by a natural 
breakwater of fringing coral reef before a drop off into 
deeper water. It is shallow enough to plant in but also open 
enough that there is considerable wave action and current 
which is essential for nutrient mixing in the planted waters. 
Light, water quality, temperature, salinity, and wave action 
are all important factors in a seaweed site. 
 Farmers in the Caluya Islands use the bottom 
monoline method (figure 11). Nylon lines of 15-20 meters 
are staked at each end to the bottom with enough slack that 
the line floats at the top of the water at high tide. Small 
cuttings of seaweed, called seedlings, are tied to the line at 
about 5-6” intervals using “strawless”, a kind of plastic 
twine.  Also at intervals, pieces of styrofoam are also tied on to float the line at the 
desired level in the water. There is enough slack in the lines to allow them to move with 
the tides and, if a storm is predicted, to tie them tighter. This brings them under the 
surface by about a meter and away from the worst of the turbulent wave action.  
Fig 11. Seaweed lines, Panagatan. 
 After the line is ‘planted’ in the water, it will be left to grow, ideally for 1 and half 
to 2 months, before it is untied from the stakes and brought into shore for the seaweed to 
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be sun dried (Figure 12). Seaweed is dried for 2 – 5 days depending on the weather and it 
is important to keep it sheltered from rain during this time since the fresh water breaks 
down the cellulose and it loses volume and quality. Not all the seaweed harvested will be 
dried. Cuttings from each bunch will be taken and retied on the lines, thus starting the 
growing cycle again. No fertilizer or 
herbicides are used on the seaweed 
and during the growing phase the 
farmer has to visually check the 
planted seaweed lines every few days 
to catch disease outbreaks, collect any 
‘washout’ – pieces of seaweed that 
have broken off the line - and check 
for damaged lines. 
Fig 12. Seaweed drying, Imba barangay, Caluya. 
Tambalang4 can be grown in 
Caluya year round, but grows better 
during the cooler and drier months of 
October to March (Also September 
and April depending on seasonal 
weather). At this time of the year 
people will have as many lines 
continuously planted as they can manage. In the hot and rainy months from about April 
or May until August or September, people will maintain enough lines to keep income 
coming in, but will spend more time repairing lines, growing seedlings, as well as on land 
crops and other activities. The seaweed does not grow well at this time because of the 
change in winds and wave action. Still water at this time does not mix nutrients well and 
the rain brings salinity below the desired levels. The increased temperature of the water 
also makes the seaweed more susceptible to disease. So rather than lose money, seaweed, 
and labour time to disease they have learned techniques to nurse their seedling stock and 
usually harvest just enough through this time.  
 
5.2 The Labour Cycle and Division of Labour 
 
 The labour cycle varies seasonally and among planters. Heaviest times of work 
include initial set up of the planting area, and during high season planting and harvesting. 
To set up a seaweed plot, the area must be cleared of large rocks and urchins, and then 
1.5 meter wooden stakes must be made or bought and pounded into the area’s substrate at 
intervals. To plant 100 lines, for example, 200 stakes are needed. Depending on the depth 
of your area, much of this work will be underwater – not easy! As well, nylon lines need 
to be cut to the desired length and prepared with the ties at intervals. Once you have set 
up an area, maintenance labour takes much less time. Ropes and stakes can be maintained 
for many harvests and urchins are regularly fended off. Because the coral in the area has 
been so damaged from illegal fishing, black spiny Diadem urchins have come in huge 
numbers. This is common in areas where coral ecosystems have been degraded and 
                                                 
4 ‘Tambalang’ is the local term for this type of seaweed. It is called ‘guso’ and ‘gulaman’ 
in other areas of the Philippines. 
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urchins with no check will create ‘urchin barrens’ eating all the flora and fauna around. 
Some researchers feel that human collection of these urchins is helpful in restoring the 
corals (Mandagi & White 2005). The urchins collected are not wasted since they are a 
food source here. One morning, I was working with a family on their seaweed area, after 
we harvested seaweed, we collected urchins and had a fresh urchin, rice, and kinilaw5 
picnic with fish caught in cages set out that morning (Figure 13). This important type of 
family time and rest time afforded to seaweed planters is due to the flexibility of labour 
and harvesting patterns that seaweed as a crop allows 
for. A further exploration how such material 
characteristics of seaweed shape life here follows in 
later discuss
Fig 14. Tying seaweed, Panagatan. 
Fig 13. Enjoying an urchin picnic, 
Panagatan.
ion. 
ing 
d technique and to talk about local news 
anting 
esos/ 
planting.6 Paying people ensures that no indebtedness 
 The division of labour is also variable and is 
related to ownership of  lines, kinship relations and other 
labour duties such as child care and land farming. 
Lines of seaweed are owned by individuals, both men 
and women, or families. Within some families there are 
individual plots owned by the different adults, while 
other families own and work their area together. There is 
no particular age range for seaweed planting. Young and 
old have their own seaweed areas. I spoke with people 
as young as 13 who have their own plots and my oldest 
interviewee was 75 years old. She still maintains 50 
lines and is out in her boat everyday. While she still does most of the labour, she has a 
young relative who helps her by diving down to untie her lines. This type of labour 
sharing is very common amongst relatives and friends and part of the enjoyment 
expressed to me about planting seaweed is the communal aspects of it. The labour of 
tying the seedling cuttings onto the lines is usually shared by the family or done in a 
group of extended family and friends. It is common to see large groups of people ty
together and this time is also a time used to share 
knowledge an
and politics.  
 Labour swapping also happens during pl
and harvesting to ease the workload. Swapping 
depends on others’ availability if someone from 
outside the immediate family is needed. It is also 
completely acceptable and common to pay friends and 
family for their labour time. The going rate is 8 p
line tied and 150 pesos/day when harvesting and 
                                                 
5 ‘Kinilaw’ is a type of fresh fish salad popular in this area of the Philippines. It is made 
 and 
ages in the Western Visayas are 
with fresh, raw fish that is cut up and instantly pickled by squeezing it with vinegar,
then it is mixed with onions, sometimes lime and chilies. 
6 This labour rate reflects the high standard of living that seaweed planters here are 
enjoying relative to elsewhere in the Western Visayas. W
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or confusion remains if labour swapped is unequal for example. It also acts as a wealth 
redistribution method on the islands. People who have small seaweed areas or who 
cannot maintain one for a particular reason are able to make cash in this way. It is even a 
way that children here make pocket money before and after school and a means for 
mothers who are caring for young children and not able to take them out on the water to 
earn cash as well.  
 There are no strict rules that divide labour by gender here either. As I mentioned, 
both men and women have their own seaweed lines and labour reflects this. Some 
women, especially older widows, may find themselves at a disadvantage, because of a 
lack of swimming or boat skills. In this case they are restricted to shallower, less 
productive waters, and they may have to pay more often for labour help. This was the 
case with a couple of women I met that were widows or whose husband had left the 
island. Their areas were in deeper water, since their husband used to do the boat work, 
and now they either couldn’t use it or they were paying male relatives to help with the 
work. Other women who have areas are quite proficient with their boat skills and have no 
problems. Couples who have no children or whose children are in school are often found 
out on the water together. As well, the labour of land farming is shared between genders 
as well. Fishing is usually done by men, while household maintenance and childcare is 
usually done by women or people who gender identify as women.7 
 
5.3 Household income  
 
 Income from seaweed depends on how much initial capital is available for 
materials and seedlings and how large an area is available. Some people are limited by 
area while others by capital. Most planters in Caluya have between 100 and 200 lines 
planted in the peak season (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Number of lines per planter  
Number of lines Number of planters (%) 
10 – 50 8 (22) 
50-150 15 (41) 
151-250 6 (16) 
251-350 1 (2) 
351 or more 6 (16) 
Source:interviews with 36 planters  
 
100 lines of seaweed takes up about .25 of a hectare. Most people will build up the 
number of lines they have from their initial investment in materials. Seaweed grows at an 
astonishing rate compared to other cash crops, ready to harvest at full volume after 1- 2 
months by which time it will have tripled in weight. So an initial investment of even 10 
lines, for about 2000 pesos can be grown out, cut and replanted to make about 100 lines 
in as little as 4 to 5 months. At which point, 100 seaweed lines could be dried and sold 
                                                                                                                                                 
one of the lowest in the country, at an average of 100 pesos/ day (Irz et al). 150 pesos a 
day offered in the seaweed sector is significantly higher. 
7 I met a number of transsexual people on the islands who work as nannies for relatives. 
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for about 15 000 pesos (or 10 000 pesos if a third of the seaweed is keep for seedlings). I 
spoke to quite a few farmers who had started with the very basics like this and built up, 
easily paying off their initial investment, and any credit or groceries they had taken in th
mean time, in 6 months. People coming from very poor situations can even get credit for 
the initial capital/material investment if they need it. Many people saved a much larger 
sum before the
e 
y invested in seaweed planting, either from other work they were doing, or 
erhaps from wedding gifts. Table 2 shows the costs of materials based on an investment 
 100 lin  start up farm 
ber st pan Total (pesos) 
p
for 100 lines.  
 
Table 2. Cost for e
Item Num Unit co Lifes
Just the Basics     
Wooden stakes 200 1.50 p 1 yr 300 
Strawless 13 rounds  yr 80.00 p 1 1040 
Nylon lines unds  s 13 ro 280.00 p 10 yr 3640 
Seedlings 800 kg 7p/kg  5600 
Floats 5kg 00/kg  yr 1 1 500 
Tarp (for drying)  0/m 0 yrs 1000 2 5 1
Total    12080 
Extras     
Boat 1 no motor 0 600 5yrs 6000 
Bamboo(drying rack)  lengths 10 50 5yrs 500 
Nets  0 0yrs 2 7 1 140 
Tarp 2 0/m 0 yrs 5 1 1000 
    7640 
Total    19720 
 
Once a 100 line farm is established, it will cost an average of 500 pesos/ months to 
maintain with some months of the year incurring the bulk of the costs and other months 
having no maintenance costs. The main expenses incurred once a farm is established are 
fuel for motor boats, labour costs, and materials replacement. The majority of planters I 
 
0 
 to 
d 
w amount of seaweed for such a large family, but there are some families that 
spoke with who start out with a paddle boat were able to buy a motor, costing between 15
000 and 30 000 pesos, within a year or two.  
 The average income a 100 line seaweed area will yield is 120 000 pesos/year.  In 
the Western Visayas region this is just above the annual poverty threshold of 119 00
pesos for a family of five and well above the regional average annual income estimated
be 112 000 pesos (www. nscb.gov.ph). In Caluya, most family’s food consumption 
comes primarily from their own land crops and fishing, so this income would be more 
than sufficient to meet their basic needs. Tables 3 and 4 show a detailed household 
budget for a mock family of six living on Sibato Island. The information was put together 
from a number of detailed household expense and income inventories I went through 
with a variety of families. Our example family has two children attending high school on 
Caluya Island where they stay in a boarding house during the week and two children in 
elementary school on Sibato. They have 100 lines of seaweed. This would be considere
a very lo
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survive on this, therefore, this estimate represents the very lowest income strata on the 
islands. 
 
Table 3. Expenses for a family o ibato for one
   
Unit Cost (pesos) 
 
Total in pesos 
f six on S  month 
Item Amount 
Rice  1180/sac* 1770 1.5 sacs 
Fish/meat Must buy ~ 12 kg 
per m
30/kg 360 
onth  
Other groceries   750 
Water delivery  10/container 200 
Clothing  400 300 
Fuel 
 
Kerosene for lamps 20p kerosene/mth 470 
Motor gas 10ltr 45p/ltr  
Electricity 
ba r 
130 
rangay generato
  
Transportation 3 trips to Caluya 
16 trips-high school 
80/trip  368 
 8/school trip  
School Fees 
If in college 
   
 
School Living 
Allowance/boarding 
100/child to board 
100/pesos per child 
weekly allowance 
1000 
cost 
  
Taxes    
Seawee als and   avg 420 d materi
maintenance 
Other shing    farm/fi
inputs 
Labo r in  8p/line tie x 20 160 ur payments(o
kind)  
Credit taken from 
stacker/buyer 
  ~1000 
Loans to others – for 
rice or collateral, 
~500 
family help etc 
  
Medicine   100 
Total Expenses**   7628 
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** Expenses that could be added to the basic table vary from family to family but a few 
en’s college tuition and 
penses, hired land crops lo oke, church 
donation and boat repa
nco f six o Islan
Amount  
igh / low season 
Unit Price Total in pesos 
more common items  mentioned in interviews include childr
living ex  labour for , cell phone ad, alcohol, vide
irs. 
 
Table 4. Monthly I
Source 
me for family o on Sibat d 
h high / low season 
Seaweed harvested 275 kg / 130kg 30p/kg 900 8250 / 3
Seaweed washout 20 kg/60 kg 0p/kg 
collected 
1 3 3600/1800 
Fishing 
For consumption 
0p/kg quivalent of 800 if bought on  3 E
market 
Farming 
For consumtion arket 
  Equivalent of 600 if bought on 
m
Other*    
Total Gross   13 250 / 7100 
Gross - expenses    5622 / -528 (covered by credit) 
    
Annual Income   122 100 pesos 
 
This family can earn 122 000 pesos annually from their seaweed and farming/fishing 
alone.  
 * Other income may come from many sources. Reported in my interviews was 
ing, 
 cost 
y 
commodity 
er at 
 
ce to cover the cost of fuel to deliver it to Sibato, an hour 
nd half away. Planters on Sibolo have areas that are a bit bigger on average than on 
                                                
secondary income from copra, chain saw services, labour on others’ seaweed or land 
farms or hauling for buyers, sari-sari8 store, charcoal making, remittances, boat mak
carpentry, mat weaving, and barangay positions. 
 
 The above example budget is for a family living on Sibato. Commodities, rice, 
and drinking water on both Sibolo Island and Panagatan are more expensive due to 
transportation costs of bringing these items from Caluya or Mindoro. This makes the
of living considerably higher, especially on Sibolo Island. On Panagatan people generall
have larger seaweed plots, at least 200 lines, thereby making up for the higher 
costs. The price of seaweed is the same on Sibato, Caluya and Panagatan because there 
are buyers who sell directly to Cebu on all three islands. It has been between 30-32 
pesos/kg for the last year9. However, the price on Sibolo Island is significantly low
26 or 27 pesos. Since there is no buyer selling directly to Cebu on Sibolo, the
intermediaries give a lower pri
a
Sibato and they claim the seaweed grows better, but it is also, more costly for the 
population to enjoy the same standard of living as in other parts of Caluya.  
 
8 This is a small sundry store 
9 According to communication in March 2008 between myself and the main Cebu 
company that buys from Caluya, Kerry Food Ingredients Inc., the price has recently gone 
up by 3-4 pesos due to a shortage of seaweed being produced in the Mindanao area.  
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5.4 Access to areas and credit 
 
Unlike many other types of aquaculture, which takes place in fully privatized ponds, 
seaweed cultivation takes place in common resource areas. In Caluya, there is no official 
allocation of planting areas, although attempts have been made to map and regulate area
through the municipal Department of Agriculture. Essentially, when seaweed cultivation 
began to spread in the early and mid-nineties, whoever wanted to get into the business 
and had capital to buy equipment was able claim an area as big as their materials budget 
allowed them. First come, first serve. Generally, the families who entered into seaw
s 
eed 
rming h 
ile 
 more complicated process 
because most of the areas with good conditions have long been taken. Figure 15, below, 
is an image of the best area to plant off of Sibolo Island. Low tide reveals the lines of 
seaweed sitting on the seagrass and how tightly packed in the seaweed is. This area has 
about 5000 lines planted during the high growing season. 
fa  in the early years from 1986 to 1992, and who remained in the business throug
the low prices offered at this time, are the families who still hold the largest areas. Those 
families who claimed areas in the mid-1990s seem to have around 1 to 1.5 hectares wh
those entered the business more recently have between .25 hectares and 1 hectare. 
 Accessing a seaweed area has since become a much
 
Figure 15. Seaweed lines at low tide, Sibolo Island. 
 
Access is now for the most part governed by ties with family and friends who already 
have an area. This is particularly true on Sibato, Sibolo and Caluya Islands where the 
planters are all residents of the islands or of the neighbouring island. Planters I 
interviewed or spoke with who had recently started farming seaweed, had all been given 
an area by a relative who was not using the whole area anymore. Everyone in the ten 
original families on the islands are related in some way through intermarriage, therefore, 
there is usually an older family member who was one of the first planters. They will hold
a large area and may not be planting all of it anymore, but will give it to younger niece
and nephews, etc. This serves as a start up area for newcomers, but expansion is still 
limited by a finite area and people are waiting for turn over of areas still. On Panagatan
in contrast, there were many reports of areas being sold to newcomers or even rented b
owners who were leaving or not using the area anymore. This could be due to the fact 
that Panagatan is made up of transient planters and not governed by the same familial 
rules of ownership as the other islands. Prior to 1986, there were no inhabitants on the 
 
s 
, 
y 
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islands, consequently there is no entrenched social structure. That said, each group of 
residents from different areas and groups of families bring their own relational ties with
them to the island. Most people have come to the island through word of mouth and a 
guarantee by relatives already there that they can share an area. It is people who arrive 
without strong family ties established that need to buy areas and often the knowledge 
about who is selling is also received through family ties, making it difficult for some 
people to break into the market. A one hectare area may sell for 3000 to 5000 pesos. I 
met several families who had been waiting for months to find an area to plant in and we
just struggling to survive by collecting octopus to sell or working as labourers for other 
planters. Panagatan, is the only island I found that also has tenant planters These seaweed 
planters are either newcomers to the island or have lost the ownership of the area through 
debt to the buyer. The seaweed buyer and tenant farm
 
re 
er have arrangements of profit and 
 They 
nters 
 
lanter 
tacker, a new planter must have a solid reputation. 
ost people know each other already, but if new people come to the island and ask for 
ily before granting them credit. 
ithout a source of reference it is difficult to get credit, though not impossible. Buyers 
they 
 
tial. The 
s are 
d further away from the barrio on the rocky areas of the island as well 
                                                
expense sharing in these areas. One buyer I interviewed had amassed 2000 lines in this 
way and he pays for the materials needed to plant, while the planter does the labour.
split the profits 50/50. This is still fairly unusual though, and is often the result of pla
mismanagement of money, generally through gambling losses.10 The planter can get their 
area back once the credit is paid back to the buyer.  
 Familial relations also govern access to credit. Planters receive credit in the form
of cash, good, or groceries from seaweed buyers and intermediaries called stackers 
between harvests. There is then an unwritten contract that the planters will sell their 
seaweed to that buyer at harvest time. After the credit is taken out of the price, the p
receives the remaining amount in cash as usual. Seaweed that is covering credit is paid 
for at the same price as regular transactions and there is no interest on credit given. In 
order to access credit from a buyer or s
M
credit the buyer will ask around to friends and fam
W
will start the person off with a small amount and if they consistently pay their credit, 
will be trusted to take larger amounts. 
 
5.5 Politics and Regulation of Seaweed in Caluya 
 
 The arrangement of areas through kinship mimics the centre of power on the 
islands. This ‘centre of power’ partially stems from generations of control by the original 
families, but is also occupied by families who have moved up the social ladder through 
their seaweed success. Now, 20 years into the seaweed boom here, these hierarchies are
being challenged further. This centre of power is not just figurative, but also spa
most powerful families on Sibato live in the barrio with access to the barangay generator 
and the best beachfront while the less powerful family members and newer resident
located further an
 
10 Although, gambling is a frequent activity on other islands as well, as I stated earlier, 
the situation on Panagatan is somewhat less controlled by family responsibilities. I 
observed card games every night were people, both men and women, were betting vast 
sums of money, 5000 to 20000 pesos, compared with a few hundred pesos on other 
islands.  
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as further away from the good seaweed areas, the water source, generator and seaweed 
buyers. On Sibolo, it is much the same though on a smaller scale and with less 
stratification among families. The family hierarchy of the islands flows through the local 
politics and access to anything (goods, electricity, credit, or barangay positions) is 
governed by it.  
 An example of this power structure is a recent extension service offered by the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and administered by the Municipal Agricultural Off
(MAO). In 2004, the MAO was given money by the Philippines’ Bureau of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) to assist the 12 neediest members of 2 barangays (Sibato and 
 
icer 
Imba b
t 
aptains 
 on 
 
ram in the intended way. The BCs are supposed to know which 
familie el 
 
he 
 
 
 sharing agreement. Him and five other planters heard 
r 
 
effort to regulate seaweed planters’ access to areas. People reported that over the years 
there have been a couple of efforts to make planters pay officials. The Lim family claim 
arangay on Caluya). Four families received materials worth 8000-10 000 pesos 
plus 5000 pesos to start a nursery farm while 20 other families received rolls of rope, 
floats and 1000 pesos for seedlings to start a ¼ ha ‘demo farm’. Families were to be 
chosen according to statistics kept by the municipality showing health and income status 
along with suggestions from the Barangay Captains (BC). 
The MAO was very helpful throughout my research and, in this case, supplied a 
list of the 24 families that were given the assistance, complete with the amounts each 
family received so I could interview them. Interestingly, all of the 24 recipients on the lis
had been either barangay officials at the time or closely related to the barangay c
(BC). In fact, one of the BCs themselves had received a nursery grant worth 12 700 
pesos. For the most part the barangay officials already enjoy a high standard of living
the islands and do not seem to be the most appropriate candidates for the program. This 
example speaks to the patronage practices of politics in the area, as in other Philippines 
municipalities, but it also speaks to the lack of skills and support given to local 
government units. The DA officer has very little at his disposal to actually implement and
monitor such a prog
s are more needy, and certainly do, but they often have more power than low lev
municipal officers like the DA to control money as it flows through them supposedly for
distribution. A few of these families genuinely benefited from this assistance, but it was 
clear from my research the most needy families in the barangays had never heard of t
assistance program 
One of the planters who received the assistance (brother-in-law of the BC) said
that it definitely helped his family. Although he had paid off a start up loan he received 
from his sister (a stacker and the BC’s wife) after one harvest, the assistance meant that 
he did not have to take another loan to expand. Interestingly, he described the MAO
assistance received as part of a
about the program and agreed that he would get the assistance this time and share the 
materials received with another family. This he did and in the next round another plante
would do the same. In this way what appeared to be helping only one family was actually
spread further than records indicate. Unfortunately, the next round of funding from 
BFAR has yet to materialize.  
 Questionable motives and implementation are also behind the local government’s 
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ownership of Panagatan Islands11 and for a few years were making some planters (not a
planters reported this) pay them 1 pesos/kg of seaweed sold. There was also a couple o
years were people were made to pay a mayor’s permit for planting seaweed. This is 
closely intertwined with the very conflictual, at times violent, politics of the area. Tw
families, the Frangues and the Lims, have controlled municipal politics here for over 
forty years. Oscar Lim was in power for twenty years between 1972-1987 (shortly af
the people power revolution ousted Marcos the people of Caluya sought a return to 
elections), and again from 1988 to 1992. The Lim regime is remembered, by some, for 
violence and killing, especially on Sibay Island. Nikita Frangue was then elected to 
mayor and stayed for the maximum number of terms, three three-year periods, until 
replaced by her husband for two terms. In May 2007, Oscar Lim’s brother, Renanta Lim 
won the local elections. While I was doing my field work in June, the elections of May 
14th were still being contested and accusations of vote fraud had been levele
ll 
f 
o 
ter 
d at Lim. 
a 
 of 
 think that it would ever materialize into actual regulations. 
People spoke of vote buying. This is, apparently the first time vote buying has happened 
in the municipality and people were rather surprised even given the contentious nature of 
politics here.12 It was not until July 1st that Lim was inaugurated as mayor. 
 The latest attempt at regulation is an effort to measure and map each seaweed area 
and create a permit system. Each family would be allowed only one hectare and any extr
hectares would be redistributed. This has been started on Sibato and all the areas have 
been measured and marked down. The DA officer diligently worked on the island for two 
weeks doing his duty and taking his directions for which areas belonged to whom from 
the BC. Most people knew that this had happened, but planters had not been informed
the results and did not seem to
Indeed, the whole process was on hold awaiting the outcome of the municipal elections 
since the new mayor was expected to fire most of the municipal staff, who had been 
appointed by the old mayor.  
                                                 
11 After the islands were declared a conservation area, another family challenged the 
Lims in court and had the islands declared municipal property. Nonetheless, many people 
on the islands are not aware of this decision and are still fearful that the Lim will ask for 
money.  
12 Vote buying claims during the May 2007 elections were in the news daily while I was 
there and, anecdotally, people felt that it was getting worse over the last few years. The 
price for a vote in Caluya was high at 1500 pesos compared to the university town I was 
staying, which people reported as being 300-500 pesos. The vote buying in Caluya was, 
reportedly, backed by 5 million pesos from the coal mining company on Semirara and a 
further 5 million from the governor. According to hearsay, both amounts were given to 
one candidate, a former BC on Semirara. It is not surprising that the Caluya mayor post is 
so sought after. This is not because people want to control seaweed, but rather because 
Caluya is the richest municipal government in the province. They receive 50 million 
pesos annually from the coal mine under the law, a part of the 3 per cent of gross revenue 
that by contract goes to the Department of Energy (www.semiraramining.com). 
According to some municipal council members, though, not a peso of that money has 
ever made it to the budget meetings of the council. The state of basic infrastructure and 
lack of necessities like running water, electricity, roads, and health care, is all the more 
neglectful when faced with this possibility. 
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 According to the DA the impetus for the regulation came from planters who had
complain
 
ed about too many conflicts over areas. I did not speak to a single planter who 
ad requested such a process and most felt there was not enough conflict to warrant the 
eas felt that it would be beneficial to break up 
e large areas and give more people a chance to enter the market, while those who had 
big are
, 
r; 
rner. Others used a particular type of float on one 
 
hen 
f 
ften seemed to be the one who 
 
                                                
h
regulation. Some planters who had small ar
th
as felt that it would be unfair since they had done the hard work of clearing the 
area.13  
 
5.6 Conflict and Common Resource Areas 
 
How are privately owned seaweed lines integrated in an open access space? This 
was one of the main questions my initial research set out to clarify. To the untrained eye
the hectares upon hectares of lines surrounding the islands seem to have no boundaries 
demarcating them from one another. How does one planter tell their lines from anothe
how does one know if an empty area really is empty or just not in use or used as a boat 
lane perhaps? The usual answer to these questions was that everyone “just knew” whose 
area was whose. Upon further inspection, I did discover that some people marked their 
areas with long sticks, or flags in one co
end of each of their lines like a green plastic bottle, for instance. Some planters have 
washout nets fixed on the bottom for the length of one side of their area to catch pieces of
seaweed that breaks away from their lines. These nets act to demarcate certain areas, but 
still many areas just seem to flow into one another and conflicts arise from this lack of 
clear ownership to the planting areas.  
 Conflicts arise when planters overlap or ‘inch’ into neighbouring areas; w
someone plants in an area that has seemingly been abandoned by the former owner only 
to have them return to reclaim their area; when areas that have been lent are not returned 
to the lender upon request; or when seaweed lines are stolen out of people’s areas. Since 
the seaweed farming is not regulated by a particular organization there is no official 
mechanism to deal with conflicts between planters. Almost all of the planters I 
interviewed had at one time experienced such a conflict and described various means o
resolution. Most conflicts were sorted out between the people involved by a compromise 
of some sort. Surprisingly, the original owner of the area o
just gave the offender part of the area rather than escalating the conflict. This may have 
been because the encroacher was from a more well connected family and the owner felt 
that they might lose the area entirely if the conflict was taken to the Barangay Captain 
(BC) for resolution or, as stated to me, simply because the owner was no longer using the
whole area and was satisfied with their current situation.  
 
13 Some mentioned that it was the BC idea and, in confidence, people shared that they felt 
the real reason was “envy” the BC felt towards the planters from Caluya Island who used 
the Sibato waters. The regulation would give first priority to residents and residents with 
more than one hectare had the option of giving their excess to a relative before handing it 
to the DA. Thus, the ‘transient’ farmers, as they were called even though many had been 
planting there for 8-10 years, would be forced out. This reflects the ongoing tension 
between residents and off-island planters. 
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 Conflicts not solved by the parties themselves are taken to the BC for a resolutio
The Barangay Captain will often ask friends and family to verify the claims to
n. 
 ownership 
ed 
the 
s, 
, spreading rumours, a stabbing, and even a shooting. On Sibato and 
Sibolo,  
r 
 
ocal 
e 
ce 
ct 
 
 
l planters from Caluya or those that have 
 
g 
 area. Several activities all take place in and amongst planted seaweed 
lines. Access is open to anyone. They need not own the particular lines nearby. Such 
activites include: octopus fishing, gill net fishing, and setting fish traps; sea cucumber 
 
nes; 
 
and how recently the owner had been planting on it in order to come to a decision as to 
who was the rightful owner. It is a rule of thumb in the community that areas abandon
for more than a few years can be used by someone else, especially with permission of 
owner’s relatives. If the original owner returns and really insists on planting in an area 
again then usually a compromise of some sort is worked out through the BC. 
 A very few of these conflicts have escalated to violence including stealing line
damaging boats
 where most people are related and the communities are more tight knit, many
such conflicts around seaweed actually spring from long histories between families o
from previous incidents not involving seaweed. Conflicts between residents and transient
planters from Caluya Island also arise on Sibato and are often framed in an us versus 
them rhetoric. 
Conflicts on Panagatan, however, were almost always talked about as being 
between people from different areas, particularly between Cebuanos and more l
planters. A handful of planters from Cebu, were originally brought to the area in the late 
1980s by a Cebu processing company to ensure a larger share of the seaweed volum
came to them rather than going to local buyers who were selling to Manila at the time. 
Even though this happened at least 15 years ago, it is still mentioned on the islands. Sin
then Cebuanos and others who migrate here do so through family connections. 
 Interviewees from Cebu often expressed feeling a lack of power in such confli
situations. They did not think taking the conflict to the Barangay Captain would be 
helpful and felt that the captain always favour the local Kinaray-a speakers over the 
Cebuanos. Although, Panagatan has well over 400 households on the three islets it has 
not been deemed a barangay with its own officials, but is under control of a barangay on 
Sibay Island, an hour away. Issues have arisen between the BC there and planters on 
Panagtan. The elementary school was shut down by her in the last two years. Some say it
was because people on Panagatan did not vote for here. This is much more of a hardship
for families who live on Panagatan full time or who come from further afield. Since the 
closest elementary school is on Caluya, the loca
friends or family there can send their children to board with them. The others have to pay 
to board their young children in Caluya with a stranger or send them back to their home 
island elsewhere in the Philippines. The transient planters seemed to have received the
message and those that experience conflicts over areas often give up their claim feelin
that there was no fair mechanism to resolve it. 
  Despite these power issues around the ownership of seaweed areas, communities 
here have successfully integrated private ownership of a resource with communal access 
of surrounding
collection, abalone collection, anemone collection, urchin collection, and ornamental fish
collection; seaweed washout collection; boating access lanes; washing of seaweed li
and toileting.  
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 It is only the lines themselves that are considered private property and as long as 
o damage to seaweed occurs traditional activites continue. Resources customarily 
Seaweed farming economics in Caluya Municipality is governed by a kin based 
 intermediaries and buyers. The relationship between 
e planter and the buyer is not
asically control much of the economy of the islands and the farmers are reliant on them 
r cash, credit e
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5.7 Local Economics of a Cash Crop 
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Figure 16 shows the movement of seaweed from the farm to the local buyers of seawe
who then sell it to processors in Cebu. A seaweed ‘stacker’ is an intermediary between 
the planters and the local buyer and, is usually attached to one particular buyer becau
capital loans from them and family loyalty. ‘Stacking’ seaweed refers to the practice of 
stocking many sacks of seaweed over a series of harvests before selling them to a 
A seaweed stacker is so called because they buy seaweed over a period of time from, 
perhaps, 10-30 planters who live in their vicinity
for store, $ for seaweed 
buyer in a bulk sale. For example, on Sibato Island there are two buyers of seaweed 
living on the island, the Barientos family and the Arelanos family. The Barrientos have 
21 stackers throughout the municipality, 7 on Sibato alone. Buyer Joe Barrientos 
explains, “here there is a relation system. When one of the stackers has a big family and 
they are your stacker  - you get more volume.” 
 Planters can also sell directly to the buyers, thereby earning 1 more pesos per 
kilogram, but many choose to sell instead to stackers, because a closer relation facilitates 
more flexible credit and emergency cash loans. As I mentioned earlier, it is generall
through kin references that credit becomes available to planters, but it was not always 
Stackers and buyers learnt the hard way that they had no back up when someone def
on credit. In the initial years of the relationship between Caluya’s buyer and the Cebu 
companies, the managers from Cebu advanced capital to the local buyer so that they had 
enough cash to advance credit to planters, therefore, expanding the industry. These 
advances did not carry any interest, but like the local system this guaranteed a certain 
amount of volume for each company and stopped local buyers selling to competing 
companies. Credit was given out by the buyers to any planter who asked for it, upwards 
capital for len
Seaweed 
planter 
Seaweed 
stacker 
buys for 
29peso/kg  
$, groceries, credit Seaweed 
buyer 
buys for 
30pesos/kg Seaweed
Ceb
pes
Seaweed to 
u 36 
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of 100 000 pesos in some cases. It quickly became apparent that too many planters wer
unable to pay back their large loans and would just move to another buyer leaving people 
out of pocket. A few buyers were forced out of business, leaving the five buyers who 
remain today. Now that these buyers are firmly established and are loyal to certain 
companies, the Cebu buyers no longer give advances. Local buyers have enough capital 
to advance it to their most trusted stackers who continue the credit system in a similar 
manner. Other stackers use their own capital for advancing credit. All buye
e 
rs and stackers 
are now much 
ew 
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ause of t
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 at 
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well and have reduced their own seaweed lines to 150. 
 
needs 
more wary with the credit they give, looking for people who are vouched 
for and only advancing small amounts up to 5000 pesos at a time. I spoke to very f
planters, overall, who had major issues paying off their credit. Most people were able to
recover their initial credit for start up within 6 months and are able to cover the credit 
they now receive with every harvest. Many no longer have to take credit.  
 In reality, the above diagram is somewhat fluid between the boxes. People 
move between planting and stacking, and buyers were once planters and stackers. 
Stackers and buyers often still have areas that they plant. There are no strict barriers t
anyone wishing to be a stacker as long as they already sell to a buyer regularly, have 
capital, a few other planters willing to sell them seaweed, and a place to store the 
y is saving enough capital to be able to advance credit 
e tried their hand at stacking for a few years and 
seaweed sacs. The main difficu
other farmers. Many planters ha
returned to only to planting bec
planters have no desire to move
money in children’s education a
he risk of losing money to defaulters. Many 
up the seaweed ladder and would rather invest their 
d other businesses. Stackers who manage to stay in the 
business for awhile certainly do very well and have a 
significantly higher income than people who only farm. 
 For example, one of the main stackers for the 
Barrientos on Sibato buys seaweed from approximately
20-30 planters and in the good season will buy about 
30-50 tonnes of seaweed per month. Even if she only 
makes 1 peso per kilogram on her sale to the Barriento
she is still grossing between 30 000 – 50 000 pesos per 
month. She bears the labour expenses for transporting 
the sacs of seaweed down the island to the Barrientos
 pesos/ sac (30 tonnes would be about 300 sacs or 150
esos). With the money from her and her husband’s 
wn 300 seaweed lines they have able to save enough 
oney to start a sari sari store, become a stacker, and 
eventually buy two large fishing boats with a crew of 
six. They now have a commercial fishing business as
The extra area is now planted by a relative who does 
not to plant in the area, instead agreeing to sell the 
harvest to her. This type of story is common among stackers and buyers. They start out 
with small areas and build them up, eventually saving enough capital to move up the 
chain or diversify into other ventures.  
It is much more difficult for planters to move up to being buyers now that there
are 5 well established local buyers who already have contracts with Cebu. A buyer 
Fig 17. House of seaweed stacker and 
BC of Sibato, Local buyer lives next 
h a similar house, large store. door wit
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to amass a large amount of capital to cover the costs of buying seaweed until they rece
payment from the Cebu companies, they must have a large storage area for the seaweed,
and they must arrange transportation on a batille (large shipping boat) to Cebu. Only one 
of the local buyers owns their own batille. The other buyers pay between 1.60 or 1.80 
pesos per kilogram of seaweed transported to the batille operators. The processing 
company, once the seaweed reaches Cebu, pays for land transportation. Although the 
difference between the seaweed farmgate price of 30 pesos/ kg and price received from
Cebu is 6 or 7 pesos, in reality the local buyers margin is 1 or 2 pesos per kilo after they 
cover transportation, labour and fuel costs. This still works out to a substa
ive 
 
 
ntial profit. If 
0 tonnes14 is being shipped the buyer will make 80 000 pesos profit, which can be 
or their store and credit system. The buyers are certainly the most 
ealthy in the local seaweed chain, with large, concrete houses and noticeably higher 
like 
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quality ese lower 
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reinvested in goods f
w
standard of living as well as a number of commodities that others are not able to buy 
generators, piped water for washing, TVs, etc (Figure 17).  
 
5.8 Quality Control 
 
Like other cash crops, the processing companies expect a certain standa
 and if that standard is not met, financial penalties follow. The risk of th
s borne by the local buyers and is a further reason why the stacker system is in 
ccording to Joe Barrientos, local buyer,  
 
it “is the influence of the stacker to control the quality of seaweed. For 
example, you can make sure the seaweed is dried already through the 
stacker [before it is sold to you]. If [the planters] sell it directly here, it is 
difficult for them because we open [the sacs] to check.” 
 
 The major buyers of seaweed from Caluya are Kerry Food Ingredients, a 
Philippines subsidiary of an Irish company, and Shemberg Co, a wholly owned 
Philippines processor and exporter. When the seaweed arrives from Caluya at a Cebu 
processing plant it is sorted to separate out foreign material, such as styrofoam bits, ext
sand or ties on. At this point it is also tested for moisture content (how dry the seawe
is) and gel strength, the quality of which will vary depending on the maturity of the 
seaweed and any diseases it may have. Each company has standards set for acceptable 
levels of foreign matter and gel strength. Kerry Foods for example, accepts a moisture 
content of 40% or less and only 1% foreign matter. If a shipment of seaweed does not 
meet these standards then a reduced price will be offered to the Caluya buyer. If the
moisture content is not low enough then the Caluya buyer has the option of redrying the
seaweed themselves or taking the reduced price. The company has a 
for sun redrying of seaweed that buyers can use, but they must pay for local labours to 
the work. It is usually less costly to take the reduced price. Too much foreign matter i
the dried seaweed will also reduce the price. As well, if the seaweed was not dried 
 
14 During the high season for seaweed, for example, the Barrientos are shipping 80-90 
MT twice a months to Cebu, while in the low season they will ship that once a month.  
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properly by the planters before the buyers bought it, by the time it arrives in Cebu, the 
shipment will have dried further and weigh less than when bought.  
  At one time this was a major problem for the Caluya buyers. They had already 
paid the going rate to the farmers for the seaweed on the assumption that they would
receive the stated rate from Cebu. When they receive a reduced rate due to quality it 
comes directly out of their profits. The problem stems from the practices of some 
farmers. In order to receive mo
 
re money for their sacs of seaweed, farmers would fill the 
iddle
 into 
 
of 
uy from that farmer again if his practices do not improve. Now, it is very rare in Caluya 
ct all the companies interviewed said that the highest 
uality seaweed in the Philippines comes from the Caluya area and is given a higher 
xtent 
less 
 
                                                
m  of the sac with wet seaweed (which weighs more) surrounding it by dried 
seaweed, thus making the sac heavier and worth more money. Unless the buyer cuts
the sac to look at the centre they do not know. Improper drying also results in over
weighted sacs. If the seaweed is not dried on a relatively clean area, there will be sand 
and debris within it that not only adds to the weight falsely, but is also counted as foreign 
matter by the Cebu company. 
 Such practices were stopped by buyers in Caluya through the simple exercise 
marking on each sac the name of the farmer who sold it. It is easier to rely on each 
stacker who only handle only 10-20 farmer to do this. Thus, if the Cebu company 
discovers a problem it can be traced back directly to the farmer and the buyer will not 
b
to encounter such practices and in fa
q
price. Distinct from other cash cropping or contract farming experiences, this is the e
of control that the companies are able to exert over the production practices of the 
farmers and does not require significant investment in new technology to comply with.15 
 
5.9 Pricing and Market Knowledge 
 
 Once the seaweed has passed all the requisite tests, after about five days, the 
money is transferred to the Caluya buyers bank accounts in Mindoro. While the trend in 
the price of seaweed has been ever upwards since the price of 3 pesos per kilogram in the 
early 1990s to the current price of 31 pesos per kilo at the farmgate, it fluctuates up and 
down by 1 or 2 pesos every few months. This suggests someone in the chain receives 
than what they bought the seaweed for. In fact, there is system of accommodation in 
place when prices change. For example, the Cebu company will tell a buyer that they 
need 500 MT, for which they will pay 36 pesos/kg. It may take months for the buyer to
 
15 Interestingly, the same efforts have not been able to bring the quality standards of 
seaweed from the Zamboanga Peninsula up. Although this is the third largest producing 
area in the Philippines, buyers are beginning to stop buying from there or are offering 
much lower prices due to the high amount of foreign matter found added to the sacs to 
increase weight. The problem seems to have become worse in last few years. Some 
speculate (Jain 2006) that this is due to the more desperate living situation of farmers 
there looking for as much per kilo as possible, as well as the more transient nature of the 
farming there as people are fleeing from conflict. This makes it more difficult to trace 
quality and maintain relationships with some farmers. As the planters receive lower 
prices, though, the practice worsens because they are more desperate to recover the price 
depreciation.   
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accumulate that much seaweed, during which time the price drops to 35 pesos. The Cebu 
buyer will still honor the verbal agreement of 36 pesos until the buyer fulfills the volum
The same accommodation is continued down the line, before the price changes at th
farmgate. This accommodation style may stem from th
e. 
e 
e long standing relationships the 
s 
ompanies said that price haggling was common between them and the 
 on 
as 
 
s 
e 
 (2006), 
ers 
 
l in 
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buyers have with the company. The five remaining buyers stuck have stuck with the 
company through tough times and the difficulty of forming new relationships for both 
sides may not be worth the possible profit to be had from shopping around. Not only doe
the remoteness of many seaweed-producing areas make it difficult for local buyers to 
form contracts with companies, but it also is difficult for processors to find trusted 
suppliers in a community where they are an outsider.  
 The Cebu c
local buyers, suggesting some power on the side of Caluya. However, the local buyers
Caluya did not feel as though they had much leeway to ask for higher prices. There h
been for two years, an undersupply of seaweed in the Philippines16 than required for the 
processors needs and it is a farmers’ market. Despite this, the difficulty mentioned above 
of moving between companies limits the buyers and, therefore, the planters’ ability to ask
for higher prices. 
 Moreover, a lack of market knowledge on the part of the farmers also impacts 
their ability to ask for hirer prices. The price of seaweed in Cebu is guarded closely 
Caluya with only the buyers. When asked, only a couple of my interviewees had a gues
at the price outside Caluya and most has not thought about it. Nor did most planters, even 
know what the seaweed was processed into or why. Many complained that the price was 
too low, especially on Sibolo island, but with only a handful of buyers to sell too, there 
was a monopoly on pricing of sorts. This also reflects the differentials in power. While 
those hirer up the ladder, especially at the export level, are focused on profit margin, th
seaweed planters depend on the seaweed industry for their daily survival. Jain
argues that it stems from a culture in the industry that has evolved over the years and still 
keep farmers at a disadvantage despite it being a seller’s market. In Caluya, the relational 
ties that govern buying and selling seaweed may be the reason there is less exploitation 
here than in other seaweed producing areas, especially in Mindanao where many farm
are migrants from conflict situations. Here, the stackers and buyers are making a tidy 
profit, but are not pushing the price down to make more than 1 peso margin.  
 I also questioned planters about the possibility of cooperatives here. Given that
Caluya is producing very high quality seaweed, a cooperative could be more powerfu
asking for a higher price than individual farmers. Unanimously, people were against this 
idea, citing past experience. There have been a couple of attempt in the past to set up 
cooperatives, but they were co-opted by elite politicians who took the membership fees 
and ran. A ‘fair trade’ type of commodity chain where farmers groups could sell dire
to organic niche markets for example, would be nearly impossible to implement here 
without local elites siphoning off the extra profits along the way. People are wary of 
 
16 The processors I interviewed, were forced to fill their need with seaweed imported 
from Indonesia for the first time this past year. The seaweed from Indonesia is cheaper, 
but is not good quality, therefore, they would prefer to buy from the Philippines and are 
pushing the government to support more seaweed farmers. The rising industry in 
Indonesia and Malaysia are worrisome for the Philippines industry. 
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anything that would takes their money and space away from their immediate control. T
is true of the credit system as well. In its attempts to increase the number of farmers in
seaweed, the government has worked with Landbank to create a loan system available to
farmers. Every planter I spoke with felt that the loan system was exploi
his 
 
 
tative. They 
 
 to services, exercise their rights, negotiate effectively, and hold both public 
nd private sectors accountable for their actions and inactions” (p92).  
The economic system that has evolved around seaweed planting in Caluya is 
relatively benign with little purposeful exploitation. In contrast, the residents lack of 
knowledge both around markets and their rights is being exploited unscrupulously by the 
land developers spearheading the tourist project and I will return to this in the discussion 
to follow.  
 
  
would be able to take larger loans, but at high interest, and the bank would only give 
group loans to planters meaning that 5 or 6 planters would be cosigning. A resounding
preference for individual and kin-based credit is clear. Nonetheless, I agree with Jain 
(2006) that “informed citizens are better equipped to take advantage of opportunities, 
gain access
a
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6. Global Cash Crop Meets Local Socionatures 
 
 Contrary to pro-liberalization rhetoric that draws conclusions from national level 
statistics, research on local level experience with cash crops has often revealed that the 
supposed amorality of market mechanisms can have very real marginalizing effects on 
farmers and can result in widespread environmental degradation (Winter 2004).Michael 
Watt’s (1983) work on Nigerian famine argued that the push for farmers to grow cash 
crops for export played a significant role in “the rupture of local systems” (14) leading to 
subsequent resource degradation and decreases in social power. Tania Li’s (2002) more 
recent work in Sulwesi, reveals that even when the adoption of a cash crop comes from 
within the community, agrarian class differentiation and land consolidation can still be 
the result. Political ecology work on deforestation in Central America has made an effort 
to show that it is not population pressure which at the root of environmental degradation, 
but rather conditions of market expansion, especially in the banana industry (Vandermeer 
& Perfecto 1995). As well, cash cropping has been shown to give rise to marginalization 
through loss of labour time allocation, increased corporate and state control of production 
processes, and increased food scarcity (Robbins 2004). 
 Seaweed cultivation is indeed part of the ongoing restructuring of global agro-
food networks and the integration of once subsistence based agricultural communities 
into export crop markets. As such, it shares some characteristics with other cash crops. 
Seaweed planters in Caluya are now forced to deal with new market realities such as 
price fluctuation and global competitiveness in the colloid industry. The future of their 
livelihoods may be less determined by the quality and sustainable production of supply 
than by changes in product lines and substitutions at the food processing level. Colloids 
used in food and non-food productions have specific qualities such as gelling strength, 
dispersion, and compatibility with other gums, however, companies must negotiate a 
tenuous balance between technology, innovation, supply, and price to avoid costumers 
switching to a new colloid product. In fact, carrageenan itself rose to prominence after its 
substitutability for agar was demonstrated. Typical of other cash crop commodity chains, 
the risks associated with the global market for carrageenan, as mentioned earlier, are 
borne disproportionately by the farmers with profits and exit options increasing up the 
chain. As well, the ‘intrusion’ of the global into this previously remote place has brought 
with it commodities such as TVs that are changing traditional beliefs and practices. Most 
people of Caluya welcome the figurative reduction of their isolation, but many 
conversations I had with people reveal the bittersweet nature of these changes to them. 
Many17 lament the changes in traditions like wakes, the loss of traditional knowledge by 
the children, and the increase of vices associated with access to more cash.  
Some question seaweed cultivation’s ability to restructure rural power inequities 
where other cash crops have failed (Macabuac 2005; Jain 2006). Indeed, as Vandergeest 
et al. (1999) have shown is true in shrimp farming, the size of people’s seaweed areas are 
linked to preexisting hierarchies that continue to influence people’s access to plots, as 
                                                 
17 Since this crop has been taken up in the span of one generation, interestingly, many of 
these conversations were not with older residents as one may expect, but with residents in 
the 20s and 30s who see such a difference in their younger siblings, or their children’s 
upbringing and knowledge compared to their own recent childhood. 
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well as their access to land farming areas, water, and capital. There still remains income 
stratification on the islands and social hierarchies. Nonetheless, as I discussed earlier, the 
entrenched social inequities seems to be slowly shifting and previously marginalized 
people have been able to take advantage of opportunities to improve their standard of 
living, mobility, and influence due to their increased income from seaweed farming. This 
is not just in the form of commodity acquisitions, but also through the transfer of new 
ideas. The area is difficult and expensive to travel in and out of. Previously, people 
without access to cash were basically restricted to the islands. Now, more people are able 
to physically travel to nearby cities and markets bringing back new ideas and values that 
influence local power structures.  
This is especially true with the generation now able to attend colleges on Mindoro 
and Panay Islands, and even in Manila. The number one benefit of seaweed planting that 
my interviewees mentioned is being able to pay for their children’s education. Especially 
on Sibato and Sibolo where there is only elementary school, now the second generation 
of children is able to attend high school on Caluya Island and the first generation has 
attended college. This change has been even more pronounced on Sibolo Island where the 
distance to travel to either Caluya or Semirara is an hour and a half. The elementary 
school only went to grade 4 until 1984 when grade 5/6 was added. Rodney, who grew up 
on the island, is now the grade 5/6 teacher. When he finished elementary school in 1994, 
he was the only one of his batch of 30-40 kids that went on to high school. Now, he 
estimates that up to 80% of his class will go onto high school this year. Despite 
difficulties they still face18, graduates such as Rodney are now returning successful to the 
islands. The first successful university graduate from Sibolo is now raising a family there 
and his engineering degree is being put to good use as the local manager for the tourist 
development company.  
As Li (2002) points out and as the experience here with seaweed cultivation 
supports, cash crops do not necessarily entail class differentiation or entrenchment of 
inequities. In fact, this is not the only significant way that seaweed differs from other 
export crop experiences. The result has been a generally stable system embedded 
successfully in beneficial social structures. What is more, the integration of seaweed 
cultivation has served to rejuvenate previously precarious rural livelihoods in the area. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Unfortunately, while some teachers try hard to give the children in Caluya quality 
education, it is difficult with three teachers teaching the 6 grade levels and very few 
resources. As well, often the teachers from Panay Island do not show up for class because 
of weather or other excuses. For example, during the five weeks that I spent on Sibato no 
week had a full week of school with some classes missing sometimes two days a week 
because there was no teacher. This is reportedly very common throughout the year. By 
the time the students get to high school they are already well behind and the quality of 
teaching at the Caluya High School is questionable; one of the factors still leading many 
students to drop out. Students have very little chance of getting the marks needed to 
attend a quality government university like UP, therefore, families end up paying 
exorbitant amount for them to attend private universities. 
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6.1 Local Constellations 
 
 Other researchers have also challenged homogenizing globalisation discourses, 
critiquing both those arguments that assert the world’s inequities will be flattened through 
market integration and those that portray marginalization and degradation as inevitable 
results of it (Li 2002; Lowe 1994; Mittleman 1996). Through such discourses, Grossman 
argues, “the real world of people, strategies, perceptions, conflicts and household 
relationships, and cultural histories all become homogenized before the advancing forces 
of globalization” (Grossman 1998, 18. I would also add that it is not just social 
differences that get muted, but also non-human biotic and abiotic nature that act as 
creative forces enabling and constraining globalizing forces. Grossman goes on to stress 
that studies of agrarian change must be particularly attuned to, what he calls the  
“environmental rootedness” of agriculture and aquaculture, which specifically 
contextualizes market integration experiences .  
 I argue that seaweed, as an export crop, has been beneficial for the 
socioecosystem of Caluya, due to the particular ‘constellation’19 of material 
characteristics of seaweed itself and Caluya as a place, the local social structures, as well 
as extra-local factors. This constellation has created conditions that differ from other cash 
crop experiences and are possibly more beneficial in than other seaweed cultivating 
communities.  
 
6.2 Seaweed’s Materialism 
 
“During typhoons even land farming is difficult because you might get 
nothing and it takes a long time [to recover], you can recover only the next 
year… [In seaweed] you can plant again right after the calamity… I’m doing 
land farming since I’m young in Negros, sugar cane and rice. Seaweed is 
better. It has no land preparation too; you don’t need to plow or weed it. No 
expenses in fertilizer and medicine.”  
 – seaweed farmer on Panagatan 
 
 The very ecology of seaweed has shaped the 
nature of the carrageenan commodity chain. Its 
robustness as a crop allows it to be grown in remote 
areas with turbulent weather patterns. It thrives in waters 
that have a fair current and sizeable wave action. While 
other crops are irreparably damaged by typhoons in the 
Philippines, seaweed is able to withstand such storms. 
Though it may break away from the lines the seaweed 
that washes up on shore and can be collected and 
replanted with no harm done. Amilita, a seaweed planter 
of Sibato, describes this difference: 
 
                                                 
19 I borrow this term from Tania Li’s (2002) study of cocoa farmers in Sulawesi.  
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“If I just depend on copra I can’t send my children to school. For example [our 
coconuts] were hit by [Typhoon] Seniang20 and until now have no fruits. If there 
is no tambalang what would I use to send my children to school? [We depend on] 
tambalang for everything.” 
 
The fact that carrageenan is derive from dried seaweed increases the robustness of the 
crop. It can be transported from remote places without major investment in technology to 
protect the product, as needed when exporting delicate fruits or vegetables (Figure 18). It 
can also be stored for months in its dried form with no effect on the product quality. This 
storage ability was an important factor that enabled Filipino entrepreneurs to ride out the 
oversupply of the late 1970s and wait for an opportunity to create a domestic processing 
industry. No other developing country growing seaweed has such an established 
processing industry, instead exporting the raw product to transnational processors at a 
much lower price (Bryceson 2002). Because of this, Philippines seaweed farmers have a 
more stable market to sell to and a domestic industry that is working with government in 
an effort to promote and protect the livelihood. 
Fig. 18 Seaweed drying on concrete path, 
Sibato Island. 
 Seaweeds robustness could be characterized as a negative since it has enabled 
capital to reach into even the remotest places, but for Caluya it offers an option allowing 
residents to participate in a cash market without 
having to migrate away. Residents have long been 
involved in market economies, but due to their 
remote location, transportation costs for the goods 
they could produce like mats and fresh fish meant 
they were getting low prices. A lack of options in 
the area forced many people to migrate away fro
their families and food resources to secure the
necessary for participation in activities other areas 
considered basic rights such as schooling and 
medical care. Caluya’s remoteness has also helped 
keep the production process in the hands of fa
instead of extension agents, industrial buyers or 
state regulators. Additional support for farmers after 
weather or disease calamities would be welcomed 
only if transparency could be guaranteed. Local 
politics here is widely criticized as corrupt and
far as planters are concerned, the less governmen
interference the better. The only extension service 
to have come to Caluya in recent memory recommended two techniques to increase 
production, both of which were completely infeasible in the waters of Caluya and were 
also much too capital intensive to warrant the risk. Planters own knowledge of and 
creative solutions to the inherent variables of weather and environmental conditions ha
served them well in dealing with disease outbreaks and storms. Joe, a buyer and former 
m 
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20 In December of 2006 Typhoon Seniang hit this area of the Philippines shortly after the 
most devastating typhoon in 11 years, Typhoon Durian came through.  
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planter on Sibato Island, describes an inventive way, now aided new technology, to de
with turbu
al 
lent weather:  
 
“A risk in seaweed farming, for example, is typhoons. But people now 
have radios and others have TV already. [When they hear news about a 
typhoon] they try this technique to save their seaweeds: they take off the 
floats so that the seaweed sinks; and if the seaweed sinks the force [of the 
typhoon] will be weaker, because if it is floating the force is strong. When 
the strong wind blows, seaweed will be washed out. That is why they let it 
sink; to reduce pressure. After typhoon it is still there.”  
 
Local buyers have also benefited from their ‘rootedness’ in place. International and 
Philippines processing companies from other cities do not have the relational connections 
needed to gain trust in the close knit social circumstances. Capitalizing on this, local 
buyers have been able to manage trade on the islands and direct credit systems in line 
with traditional rules of redistribution.  
 
6.3 Material Constraints on Corporate Control 
 
 As I mentioned earlier, the only control the industry is able to exert on seaweed 
farmers is a modicum of quality control. Again, this is largely due the nature of seaweed 
itself. Seaweed planters maintain control of their own inputs and are not forced, as in 
other export crops, to buy expensive seeds and fertilizers from agro-companies each 
season. Seaweed seedlings are merely cuttings from the larger plant and are always 
available. People maintain their own nursery lines, constantly renewing their stocks of 
seedlings. If a calamity such as disease or a typhoon should wipe out their seedlings, they 
can easily buy new seedlings from a neighbour or collect wash out to recover. Seaweed 
planting is so wide spread in the Philippines now that should something wipe out 
Caluya’s entire stocks, seedlings could be bought from elsewhere and slowly production 
would grow again. Corporations simply cannot patent or control the seedlings.  
 The only nutrients seaweed needs to grow is found in ocean areas with enough 
water movement, therefore, no added fertilizers or chemicals are needed. Pesticides 
would just wash away in the open ocean, so pest control is done by hand when inspecting 
the ropes. Not only does this negate the usual environmental degradation that 
accompanies intensive export crop farming, it helps to keep entry level capital costs low. 
Such farmer control over inputs is essential in keeping barriers to access low in cash 
crops. In the case of shrimp farming for example, the high cost of entry, relegates most 
rural poor to wage work on someone else’s farm. The low capital and simple technology 
needed to enter into the market has promoted the uptake of seaweed in a horizontal 
manner. This has not been a case of outside imposition of an export crop in a rural 
community. Residents embraced the opportunity to cash crop and spread the knowledge 
and technology through kin relations. 
 Corporate control is also constrained by the nature of seaweed’s growth pattern. 
Since seaweed grows in the open ocean, it is far more difficult to privatize, land title, and 
regulate seaweed plots than land plots. Caring for seaweed follows the patterns of tides 
and weather fluctuations. It cannot be governed by a set time clock of industrial 
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capitalism like crops that lent themselves to plantation farming. Not only has the nature 
of seaweed put input control squarely in the planters hands, the flexibility of labour 
needed to work with variations in daily, monthly and seasonal rhythms favours small 
holder entrepreneurs. It is not profitable for a company to hire wage labours to work on a 
seaweed plantation, so seaweed cultivation remains individually and family controlled. 
Some have argued that this type of family cash cropping creates a situation where farmers 
subsidize capital through self-exploitation (Macabuac 2005). I would argue that this self-
exploitation is not limited to agriculture, but is common in many entrepreneurial 
businesses. Moreover, are the alternatives to this hybridized livelihood - full wage labour 
or full subsistence - either feasible or more desirable? In the case of Caluya, marginal 
agricultural land and declining fish stocks makes a subsistence lifestyle extremely 
difficult and the current offer of full proletarianization, through wage work in the tourist 
industry, does not appeal to seaweed planters for a number of reason discussed in section 
7 of this paper. In fact, it is the addition of seaweed cultivation to people’s diverse 
livelihood strategies that has enabled a successful revitalization of the area’s agrarian and 
fishing livelihoods. 
 
6.4 Flexibility and Integration 
 
 The key to this assimilation is the flexible labour time allocation that seaweed 
entrepreneurs have. Seaweed plots take about 3-4 hours a day to maintain (though more 
or less may be called for at certain times in the growth cycle). This leaves plenty of time 
for planters to maintain land crops, to fish and glean marine resources, to care for 
children and the household as well as other activities. A mini case study within my larger 
case study clearly illustrates the benefits of the material characteristics of seaweed: 
 
Seaweed and Food Security in Caluya 
 
Fig. 19 Some of the more 
rocky land on Sibato. Planted 
here with corn.
 The Caluya Islands have always experienced precarious food security for a 
number of reasons. They are located at the meeting place of three seas: the Sulu Sea, the 
Sibuyan Sea, and the Mindoro Straight. Thus, they experience tumultuous ocean currents 
and waves as well as the turbulent typhoon weather of the 
Philippines. This leads to periodic destructions of land crops 
and regular storms that leave people stranded on their 
islands. While I was staying on Sibolo Island, we 
experienced a storm that isolated us on the island for six 
days. Seas were so rough no boats could get offshore even 
to fish. This is apparently common every rainy season an
often can last for weeks. In fact, during the rainy season 
ferries through the Caluya Islands are often stopped 
altogether cutting people off for weeks from Mindoro and 
Panay Islands. Residents told me that previously, these 
weather events would lead to food shortages. With no 
electricity and, therefore, no refrigeration, fresh fish would 
soon run out and other food items would spoil. People were 
left to subsist on dried fish and root crops that could be 
d 
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found.  
 Agricultural land on the islands is sufficient to provide most of people’s 
vegetables and fruit for consumption, but it is too rocky to grow their staple food: rice 
(Figure 19). The practice of halili is how people get their rice on Caluya. Previously this 
meant, people would go to Mindoro to work on the rice fields there trading their labour 
for rice supplies. This, as well as migration for other cash work often left their own food 
crop land untended. As well, in recent decades, illegal fishing, commercial overfishing, 
and pollution have led to serious declines in their fishing catch and therefore, their main 
source of protein.  
 With the uptake of seaweed cultivation, much of this changed. Unlike other cash 
crops, it is grown in the ocean and, therefore, does not displace food crop land, nor is it a 
case of a diet staple being exported out of the community. A major shift in labour 
relations has increased the amount of labour time available for food resources. As 
mentioned above, seaweed has offered the opportunity for people to move permanently 
home and still earn cash. This has meant more labour available for food crops, fishing, 
and food gathering and the flexible nature of seaweed planting allows for these other 
activities to be major parts of the work day. No longer is a member of the family away 
doing wage work, leaving other members entirely in charge of food and household 
maintenance. Now, most families I worked with share the labour of both seaweed 
planting and food crops. 
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Fig 20. Seventh birthday party of Barangay 
Captain’s son, Sibolo. The entire island 
waited for their turn to eat. It took about 
three hours to feed everyone.  
 Food sharing practices on the island also play an important redistributive role. It is 
common for families and neighbours to give 
food to each other to help with shortages, with 
the expectation of reciprocation in the future. 
More wealthy members of extended families 
are also expected to share their resources with 
poorer families and frequently do so. The time 
available to people during the day is essential 
for maintaining this food sharing (Figure 10). 
Community activities usually involve food 
sharing and these events are important parts of 
poorer families food strategies.  Such events 
include birthday parties, wakes (which go on 
for days), and other family celebrations. These 
events, especially if hosted by a barangay 
official, are expected to provide food for 
anyone who attends, especially children and happen once or twice each week. Larger 
community food sharing events include barangay and religious fiestas. 
 Labour time allocation is further improved because of the flexible growth and 
harvest patterns of seaweed. Seaweed grows year round and can be planted at almost any 
time. This allows planters to plan their labour schedules according to how much time 
they want to spend on their seaweed, their land crops, and other activities depending on 
the rhythm of the seasons and social life. Furthermore, seaweed can be harvested at any 
time during its growth cycle. Ideally, it is best to let it grow for 1.5 -2 months in terms of 
quality, but there is no particular time when it is “ripe” like other crops. As this seaweed 
planter from Caluya Island explains,  
 
“It helps a lot because, if you don’t have rice, if you can harvest even just one 
monoline [of seaweed] you will have rice.”  
 
 Having seaweed really is like having a savings account; it is basically cash in 
hand. If there is an emergency, a planter can harvest seedlings only put in the water the 
day before. They can dry them and get cash right away. The ability to plan harvest times 
outside of a strict natural season, helps families plan financially for expensive activities 
like weddings. For example, many families plant a large batch of line at the end of March 
so they can harvest in volume in time for college tuition fees in June.  
 Seaweed may not displace land crops, but how does it integrate with marine 
resources? As mentioned earlier, though the seaweed lines are privately owned, fishing 
and marine resource collection happens in and around the lines in an open access system. 
In fact, according to locals21 the seaweed is helping to regenerate the damaged coral 
ecosystems around the islands. The seaweed areas have now been planted over top of the 
damaged coral for almost 15 years. This has acted as a protective cover and stopped 
inshore dynamite and cyanide fishing. Lines are spaced far enough apart to allow 
sufficient light in so that in many places corals are visibly coming back and with them 
small fish and invertebrates. These are also attracted to the seaweed for grazing and to lay 
their eggs amongst it. In this case, seaweed has served to increase the amount of fish 
available for consumption and the marine resources available to sell. People discovered 
that octopus are particularly attracted to seaweed to lay their eggs and hide at low tide. 
Planters will intentionally bunch up their seaweed 
(Figure 21) to attract them since they fetch a high 
price on the market. 
Fig. 21 Octopus eggs in seaweed. 
 Finally, the cash flow that seaweed has 
brought to the area has also impacted food security. 
Along with immediate cash in emergencies, the cash 
has allowed to people to purchase canned and dried 
food items, which can be stored lessening the impact 
of weather related isolation. Commodities such as 
generators and iceboxes allow fish to be keep for 
longer and motors, unaffordable previously, allow 
fisher to go further afield for big fish and lessen labour time needed to travel back and 
forth from seaweed areas. Cash has also changed how people get their rice supply. Rather 
than trading labour on Mindoro for rice, halili is now done through cash. Caluya seaweed 
farmers send cash at the beginning of the rice season for Mindoro farmers to buy inputs 
and they are paid back in kind with rice delivered at harvest time, therefore guarantee a 
supply of their staple food. 
 Clearly, in contrast to other export crops, seaweed has positively affected food 
security in Caluya.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 This is corroborated by Mandagi and White’s (2003) study. 
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6.5 Co-constitution of Caluya’s Socionature 
 
 As the discussion above reveals, it is not easy to split the non-human side of the 
equation from the social. The environment is not just a receptor of human modification 
(Zimmerer & Bassett 2003), rather environmental variables interact and interweave with 
social variables creating unexpected local livelihood shifts and unintended ecological 
consequences (Castree 1997). It is not only the materiality of seaweed that conditions the 
success of market integration for a community. Case studies from Mindanao and 
Tanzania show that, while communities there are benefiting from seaweed somewhat, 
they still find themselves in a precarious position (Bryceson 2002; Jain 2006; Macabuac 
2005). I argue that there are certain characteristics of Caluya’s local social system that 
have, along with the nature of seaweed, co-constituted the success experienced here. The 
lack of local elite control of seaweed areas was mentioned earlier, other factors are 
elaborated below. 
 The kin based social structure of Caluya has created a credit system guided by 
relational trust and, therefore, not overly exploitative. Credit and loans are not just 
between planters and buyer, but also between family and friends. These zero-interest, 
risk-sharing strategies through loans and gifts allows families to better deal with income 
variation and economic shocks (Fafchamps & Lund 2003). The relational social structure 
also makes work easier through labour and knowledge sharing and a traditionally open 
access system to food resources like fruit trees, root crops and marine collection also 
facilitates a more even standard of living across the islands. Through these traditional 
structures almost all families have access to land and fishing equipment and, therefore 
have an established ‘exit’ strategy should seaweed planting become unviable. This is true 
here since most planters are established residents, unlike the situation in areas of 
Mindanao where many planters are refugees from conflict situations with no claim to 
land in their new area. Even on Panagatan, where most planters are not residents, many 
still have land and assets at home that they maintain through money made from seaweed. 
The planters and families in the most precarious situations in Caluya are generally those 
who are newcomers to their planting island and been forced to migrate because of 
economic hardship elsewhere.  
 Importantly, in Caluya the articulation between capitalist production – commodity 
production for the market, capital accumulation, and export led growth (Gibson-Graham 
2005), and kin based social reproduction activities has produced what Gibson-Graham 
(2005) term a “diverse economy”. By mapping out some of Caluya’s diverse economy, 
following Gibson-Graham’s method, (Table 5) it is clear that the classically recognized 
capitalist economic activities of seaweed are contingent on many other non-market 
activities. Without these diverse economic relations, seaweed cultivation as a market 
integration strategy may not have such a positive outcome.  
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Table 5. Diverse Economy of Caluya Islands 
Transactions    Labour   Enterprise 
Alternative paid 
 self-employed – farmers, 
fishers, seaweed traders 
 ‘buligay’ – reciprocal labour 
sharing on farms 
 exchange of labour services 
 in kind payment – land farm 
help for part of harvest, 
seaweed labour for part of 
harvest 
 tenant seaweed farmers paid 
with a percentage of harvest 
 hired labour – 150 per day 
plus meals 
Unpaid 
 voluntary work to help 
baranagay 
 help with cooking and 
preparation for weddings, 
wakes, and fiestas 
 family labour on farms and 
business 
 household reproduction 
 church work 
 
Non-capitalist 
 schools 
 NGOs (in the past) 
 fishing enterprise 
 farms 
 small-scale producers – 
carpenters, chainsaw 
operators, cock breeding, 
videoke and pool table 
 tenant farms 
 
 
Alternative Market 
 ‘suki’ relations at sari sari 
store and seaweed buyers 
 sidewalk vending 
 seaweed paid for groceries 
 ‘halili’ system –seaweed 
farmers get credit, give 
capital and /or labour to rice 
farmers in Mindoro in 
exchange for rice 
 micro-credit lending 
 ‘patinga’ – advanced money 
for unborn animals 
 barter – fish, crops 
Non-market 
 food sharing 
 childcare sharing 
 animal and seaweed area 
caring sharing 
 care of household 
 school feeding program 
 gifts of money to 
newlyweds 
 ‘gala’ –sharing of fiesta 
expenses 
 donated labour and 
materials to build school 
 debt of gratitude 
 ‘bulos bulos’ – sharing of 
seaweed area from season to 
season 
 free water source built by 
one family  
 The ‘transactions’ column shows the way in which goods, finances, and services 
flow between actors and are reciprocated and redistributed. Many of these flows are ways 
that people in Caluya access cash, credit and assistance with financial burdens outside of 
formal institutions. The ‘labour’ column includes work traditionally left out of economic 
valuation and demonstrates range of unpaid labour practices while the ‘enterprise’ 
column shows work that is not necessarily under capitalist relations of production. What 
is clear is that the more capitalist market relations of seaweed are supported by “a thick 
mesh” of traditional practices, through which “a network of bonding and bridging 
relationships creates complex interdependencies within and across kin groupings and 
neighborhoods” (Gibson-Graham 2005, 16) It is these practices, as evidenced in the food 
security discussion, that are indispensable for redistributing wealth and decreasing 
inequity on the islands.  
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6.6 Vulnerabilities of the Seaweed Industry in Caluya 
 
 The same social kin networks that support the well being of most people in 
Caluya, can also have negative consequences for others. Such tightly knit communities 
can exclude outsiders and isolate marginalized members as well as place excessive claims 
on group members and restrictions on individual freedoms (Turner 2007). This has 
created barriers to entry or expansion for some such that it is increasingly difficult for 
newcomers to access areas in Caluya. Consequently, though this has yet to happen in a 
widespread way here, possible future conflict and consolidation of scarce areas may 
result. This may also occur in the future if the kin based risk-sharing structure is unable to 
absorb large financial crises. In fact, two of the processing company managers I 
interviewed in Cebu felt that the lack of safety net for planters was the main reason there 
has been an undersupply of seaweed in the Philippines over the last two seasons. Many 
planters, they said, did not have the capital resources to restart after major crop losses to 
disease or weather events. To this end, the Seaweed Industry Association of the 
Philippines has been working with the government to create insurance schemes for 
seaweed planters. 
 Changes in the ecosystem seaweed relies on for nutrients may be one of the 
largest vulnerabilities seaweed planters face. Seaweed cannot grow in polluted waters; 
even slight pollution makes it more susceptible to disease. Planters on Semirara Island, 
Caluya have already learnt this. As the coal mine there continues to expand and create 
polluted runoff, planters have been forced to abandon their seaweed. I met many planters 
from Semirara trying to restart their farms on Panagatan Cays instead. Planters in the rest 
of Caluya asserted that the pollution from Semirara also affects their seaweed. Over the 
years, the good seaweed season has shortened and many feel that this is not just due to 
normal weather patterns. During certain times of the year monsoon winds in the area 
change direction and instead of blowing from Sibato, Caluya and Sibolo towards 
Semirara, they blow from Semirara, often carrying with them pollution. A number of 
planters reported actually being able to see a black coating on their seaweed at this time 
of the year. This certainly seems a credible explanation since the smoke plumes from the 
coal mine are visible from Sibato which is two hours away. Most interviewees who had 
been planting since the start of the seaweed boom trace the beginning of the downturn in 
seasonal productivity to the late 1990s, which coincides with corporate restructuring and 
increased mining activity at the Simrara coal mine (www.semiraramining.com and pers. 
com. with researchers at the University of the Philippines22) In Barangay San Roque, 
Mindanao, Macabuac (2005) has documented that the seaweed there has stopped growing 
in the shallow areas because of increased pollution as well as fresh water run off from 
                                                 
22 These researchers had been on Semirara in 1996 assessing the impact of an oil spill off 
the coast. Among them were experts on mangrove ecosystems, and since the island is 
usually closed to researchers, they also did some assessment of the environmental 
damages being sustained by the coal mining operations as well as some of the devastating 
social marginalization there. Once the company found out, they were told in no uncertain 
terms to cease inquiries and had to leave the island. Since, they have been ‘informed’ that 
their research cannot be published.  
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monsoon flooding. There has been no recovery for a year and poorer households do not 
have the capital to invest in a boat for planning in deeper waters.  
 Other seaweed planters in Caluya attribute this loss of productivity to overuse of 
the nutrients in the water. As Cecilio, a planter on Caluya Island states, “it is like rice 
fields if you always plant on it… No rest...” Indeed, seaweed, though relatively benign 
environmentally does have effects on its ecosystem. Mandagi and White (2005) show 
that seaweed farms can affect the amount of light available to corals or seagrass that lie 
under the lines and as a result of different compounds they emit while growing can push 
other seaweeds and organisms out of the area. At the same time new species are attracted, 
which changes the ecosystem dynamics of the area. Planters can also damage coral and 
other substrates when planting (Primavera 2006), and this was mentioned by a planter in 
one of the Sibolo Island focus groups as being a negative effect of seaweed cultivation. 
As Zimmerer and Bassett (2003) point out socionatural systems are never completely 
stable and are “subject to change due to the dynamic nature of the environmental 
world”(4).  
 It is not just the dynamics of non-human actors that make seaweed cultivation 
vulnerable, but also the ever-shifting political economic sphere within which it is 
embedded. It is important to understand the influence that local context has, but relative 
agency should not be over-exaggerated either. Seaweed planters are still marginalized 
within broader networks and their decision to take up seaweed planting is made within a 
narrow set of choices that can change quickly. Extra-local processes exert pressure 
sometime beyond the control of local residents. In Caluya, the largest threat to seaweed 
cultivation as a livelihood is the intervention of outside capital and a competing form of 
market integration. Though seaweed cultivation has achieved relative socioecological 
sustainability, planters are not protected from powerful investment interests in tourism 
that are politically connected. The next section describes the proposal and ongoing 
process against the backdrop of Philippines tourism policy.  
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7. Tourism Comes to Caluya 
 
Fig 22. A view of the beach fronting the land bought by Fil Estates. Low tide, bottom, reveals the 
seaweed lines that stretch for acres. Line are planted from the shore out to the natural coral break 
water, just barely visible at high tide  as a dark line, top photo, on the horizon. 
 
 Ironically, the very qualities that make Caluya ideal for seaweed cultivation – 
shallow, sandy beaches; clear, unpolluted waters, and a coral reef to break the waves – 
are also considered perfect for sun, sand, and sea tourism. In fact, the characteristics 
overlap so neatly that the two markets are literally competing for the same stretches of 
beachfront. Thus far, development plans have proceeded under the watchful eye of the 
now former mayor, with very few people beyond his family and the development 
company aware of the magnitude of the proposal. The remoteness of Caluya has enabled, 
what is proving to be a contentious community issue, to proceed out of view of the 
broader Philippines public. There are no active NGOs in Caluya and, since the devolution 
of powers to Local Government Units (LGUs), local elite power dominates development 
decisions. 
  Philippines has consistently promoted tourism as a sustainable development 
alternative for rural poor and an alternative to more destructive resource extraction 
options. According to the government’s Medium Term Development Plan,  “the 
Philippines has a natural competitive advantage in tourism because of the warmth of its 
people and its natural wonders that are yet to be fully harnessed” (www.neda.gov.ph). It 
will “aggressively” market the country as a tourist destination, striving to increase visitor 
numbers and liberalize the investment environment. At the same time, the Department of 
Agriculture is also pursuing a national strategy of community based coastal management 
and seaweed cultivation to reduce rural poverty. This reflects the fragmented and 
contradictory nature of policy making at the national level. 
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 The Caluya Islands are only a four hour boat trip from Boracay,“jewel of the 
Philippines” and pride of the tourism development sector (Trousdale 1999). Now that 
Boracay has become over developed (Carter 2004), it seems that Fil Estate, one of the 
largest investors in Boracay has set out to find an new ‘unspoiled’ destination for 
development. “Nature,” as their website enthuses, is after all their “partner in 
development” (fegc.brinkster.net) and, indeed, the difference matter makes is at the heart 
of this analysis. Nature’s role in simultaneously enabling and constraining this new 
development is closely intertwined with social power tensions. The company now has 
proposed a five-year development plan for Caluya municipality (see Map 5) that includes 
hotels and resorts on Sibolo, Sibato and Caluya Islands, an international airport on 
Caluya Island, an airstrip on Sibolo Island, and a golf course also on Caluya Island. They 
have been working closely over the last few years with the ex-mayor to secure land titles 
or rental agreements with residents and to change the municipal zoning laws to allow for 
tourist development in the area.  
 Essentially, there is a struggle beginning in Caluya about who has the power to 
construct space in the image they see as most productive. Fil estates would like to erase 
the image of a ‘working’ socionature (Figure 23) and replace it with an image of paradise 
and leisure (Figure 24). It must be recalled that resources and ‘useful’ space are not 
inevitable products of nature, but are social created demands. The processes here that will 
lead to one use or another are not timeless or spaceless, but rather are products of 
environmentally rooted political struggle with “serious human, economic, and ecological 
costs impacting on real people and real environments” (Castree 1997). It is not just 
profits, but Caluya’s rural livelihood that depends on the outcome. 
 
   
  Fig.23 A couple working on their 
seaweed lines, Sibolo Island. 
Fig.24 Looking back from the shore at the 
point owned by Fil Estate, Sibolo Island.  
 I focus here on Sibolo Island where the developer has already secured land titles 
and is moving forward to get permits from the state. The following information about the 
proposed development plans is taken from interviews I conducted with two of the project 
managers from Fil Estate, Manila. While I was researching seaweed cultivation, they 
were visiting Caluya Islands, working to secure further land titles. They were also staying 
at the mayor’s house and I took the opportunity to speak with the mayor about the stage 
of the proposal. On Sibolo Island, I visited and talked extensively with the local man 
whom the company has hired to be the on site manager. He is a year younger than me, 
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with a lovely young daughter and wife. He is deeply connected to Sibolo Island and is 
happy to have found a viable living on the island, which meant he could move home and 
raise his family there. He was the first university graduate who grew up on Sibolo and 
comes from one of the central families on the island; his father has been the barangay 
captain several times and they have donated to community infrastructure projects.  
 In order to achieve the space they want, the developers wish to move the seaweed 
planters off their beachfront; what is now the most productive planting area on the island. 
Having bought the land that makes up the point of Sibolo the company would like to 
dredge around this tip, in a sweeping half circle 100 m wide, to “clean up the rocks” and 
make the area deeper for watersports (interview with Manila manager). They will then 
rebuild the existing natural coral breakwater to make it bigger. There are about 180 
people planting here with approximately 5000 lines planted during the high growing 
season and the common beach area is also used for drying seaweed, tying and preparing 
lines, resting and having lunch, sorting fish catch and docking boats, as well as numerous 
other resource gathering activities. Map 5 shows the direct spatial conflict. The proposed 
developments overlay directly on resident’s current livelihood resources. Not only are 
seaweed areas affected but agricultural, housing and leisure areas as well.  
 When asked about their intentions towards the seaweed farmers, the company 
representatives offered a number of different answers, perhaps indicating that they had 
not yet solidified a plan. At first, the local manager informed me the planters’ seaweed 
areas would be bought or leased by the company to make up for the farmers’ loss of 
profit. The company would offer 20 000 pesos for 1 ha. He was not sure if this would be 
a one time payment or annual fee Planters who have heard this offer agree that it is not 
sufficient. Most make between 15 000 and 30 000 pesos per harvest. 20 000 pesos cannot 
make up for the loss of their seaweed area. One planter expressed her misgivings about 
this: 
 
He [the local manager] said that they would give money to those who are 
affected. [I am worried] that it is for a year only; that is our yearly source 
of income…. What if you do not know how to handle another business? 
 
Given that sea plots cannot be legally titled, it may prove difficult to do this. Other 
company representatives I spoke with seemed confident they would be able to help the 
people currently planting on the affected shoreline to simply relocate to different areas 
off the island. As we looked at the sketch map together, they pointed out the areas that 
were not currently planted and, therefore, available. Either this suggestion was made up 
on the spot to appease me or the representatives clearly had no knowledge about the 
island’s geography, seaweed suitable areas, or the social context of the island. 
 The areas they hope to relocate affected farmers to are not suitable for seaweed 
planting since they are too rocky or deep, hence the reason no one is planting there 
currently. The other area they indicated is currently fully claimed and parceled out to 
resident planters. It is also the main beach front of the island from which boat traffic 
comes and goes. Since this area can only be planted seasonally, when the winds are 
blowing the right way, it may at times appear to be available. Any attempt to transplant 
hundreds of farmers into this area would result in chaos within the careful balanced 
ownership and use rights that are already recognized. These problems are also true of the 
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company’s plan to relocate the seaweed planters on the beachfronts of Imba Barangay on 
Caluya Island. Further infrastructure planned for Sibolo includes a 2.2 km long airstrip. 
This airstrip is planned on the island’s only agricultural land. 
 
7.1 Material and Social Constraints 
 
 The remote location of Caluya Islands, and especially Sibolo Island, presents Fil 
Estate with an ‘unspoiled’ paradise to attract tourists, but it also presents difficulties in 
getting them there. Until an airport can be built, Fil Estate plans to ‘fast ferry’ island 
hoppers from the Boracay, the nearest established beach destination, about 4 hours by 
boat. The airport infrastructure needed is a major investment and commitment on the part 
of the company and means persuading many more people to sell their land. Another 
option the company may look at is a partnership with the Semirara Coal Mining Co. who 
have recently built an airstrip on Semirara for their company use. Landing here still 
leaves people a 2 hour boat ride away from Sibolo or Caluya Islands.  
 Lack of electricity and clean water are two issues the company is currently trying 
to address on Sibolo as well. The company brought in National Power Co to survey the 
island and plans to have private backup generators for the resort. The current wells dug 
on the island date from the early 1900s and the water sourced from them is salted. People 
use this water for cooking and bathing, but most residents have water brought from 
Caluya or Sibato, as well as relying on rainwater, for drinking. This lack of potable water 
is a major stumbling block for the development plans, but the company has brought in a 
diviner in an effort source a location on their property that may provide a freshwater, 
deep well. Water samples have been sent to Cebu for analysis. The company 
representatives assured me that if a fresh-water deep well was found it would be 
accessible to the residents of the island for no charge. 
 Securing land titles had also proven problematic for the company. Original 
titleholders who no longer live on the islands have sold much of the land already secured. 
This has caused friction between remaining family members who hold use rights to the 
land and created a tense social situation for the company’s further negotiations. Efforts 
were made on Caluya and Sibato Islands to hold quiet, private meetings with landholders, 
but in such a close knit community, secrets are difficult to contain. Existing land conflict 
between multiple claimants is also hindering the company’s acquisition plans. They are 
trying to override existing land declarations by buying land titles from the Municipal 
Assessors Office instead. Land titles are more formally recognized than declarations, but 
are also expensive to acquire. Many people fear their land declaration will be bought out 
by the company, without their knowledge. Even people willing to sell, are offended by 
the low prices offered by the company. They have offered to lease the land at 3.60 pesos 
per square meter  per year with the contract renegotiable after 15 years, or to buy the land 
directly for 60 000 pesos per hectare (roughly 16 pesos per m2). To put this in 
perspective, land prices for areas that are undesirable and undeveloped on Boracay 
currently range from 4000 pesos/ m2 to 10 000 pesos/ m2 (www.boracayinfo.com). 
Granted, Boracay property values are high, but even land in nearby Iloilo province, 1000 
to 3000 pesos/ m2. Fil Estate informed me that prices could be renegotiated once new 
amenities increased the value.  
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 Although, the company has been able to buy land on Sibolo, the above land tenure 
confusion and physical barriers to infrastructure development may eventually prove too 
costly for the company to overcome.  
 
7.2 Resident Perception and Power 
 
 The residents of Sibolo Island are not of one voice about the tourist development. 
A handful have sold their land and a few people I spoke with believed it would be a new 
source of jobs and income. I spoke with three girls, aged 16-18, who work seasonally on 
Boracay Island. They felt that tourism on Sibolo would bring opportunity. All of them 
worked as maids for hotels or in private houses and were paid 1500 pesos a month, but 
with the cost of rent and food were left with no extra money. Nonetheless, they enjoyed 
the excitement of the island and wanted to go back to work there in hopes of meeting a 
man to marry. Finding someone to marry is difficult in Caluya where everyone is related, 
so it is common for people to find partners through text mates, pen pals, working 
elsewhere, or from the visiting cargo boats. Thus, hoping to meet a husband through 
work on Boracay is not out of the ordinary. Older people who have children working on 
Boracay or who had visited it, are very worried that Caluya could possibly turn into a 
second Boracay. Concerns centre on the potential loss of their seaweed livelihood, but go 
beyond that and include concerns about changes in values and safety of their children. 
Concerns I heard expressed by residents during interviews, conversations and focus 
groups are gathered below (Table 6 ). 
 
 Table 6. Caluya Residents’ Concerns about Tourism 
 “Where will we be able to park our motor boat?” 
 Foreigners will bring bad habits to the islands that our children and 
husbands might follow like drugs, more gambling and videoke, 
prostitutes and girls to look at. 
 “The children will copy the habits they see. There will be so many 
people here…drugs will come…” 
 No credit system anymore if the seaweed is gone 
 Return to more fishing, but the area for fishing would be restricted 
because of the tourist development and the rocky area of the island is 
not a good fishing area. Also, fishing income is less sure than seaweed 
planting because you cannot fish during bad weather. 
 People might start dynamite fishing again 
 “When seaweed is gone, poverty will return” 
 We won’t have money to send our kids to school anymore 
 People will have to go back to looking for work in Palawan and 
Mindoro 
 The company will spray chemicals in the water to clear away algae, 
like they do on Boracay 
 The company will bulldoze the area off the shore they own and kill any 
seaweed or corals there 
 Small business may not be able to compete with big business owners 
who come to the island 
 “If my son drinks during the nights…I have hypertension and the 
worries about it will make it worse.” 
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 A week before my arrival on Sibolo the local project manager and 
company representative had held a meeting with residents of the island. Unfortunately, 
word about the meeting was not widely spread around the island and only 50 people 
attended. News spread quickly about the plans after the meeting, though, and everything 
was still being heatedly discussed when I arrived. One evening, I spoke to a group of 
about 15 adults, some of whom had been at the meeting, and all of whom were opposed 
to the plans. When asked if they had expressed their concerns at the meeting, they replied 
that they “just kept quiet”, except for one man, who asked the company manager how the 
people of Sibolo would live without seaweed. The manager replied that they would pay 
the farmers who were affected, but could not give details when pressed. After the 
company representative pointed out that the man did not even have seaweed in the 
affected area, he did not ask any more questions. This group felt that they had lost their 
chance to complain. As one woman said,  
 
“You can’t complain anymore. They said in the meeting that if you have 
problem you have to complain there and no more murmur about it after 
because there is a meeting already.” 
 
During my focus group sessions, participants described residents of Sibolo as being 
intimidated by the company representatives. Most adults have no education past 
elementary school and do not feel they can speak against people with university degrees 
from Manila. People may also feel powerless in the face of collusion between the 
company and local politicians like the ex-mayor. Even the Municipal Planning Officer on 
Caluya Island had no knowledge of the stage the proposal was at. The mayor assured me 
that he had granted all the municipal permits needed, these appear never to have been 
approved, as is protocol, by the planning office. One planter noted, 
 
“We can do nothing about it, because money runs the show. If the people 
unite they can stop it, but almost half of Sibolo is owned by the company.” 
 
 The company has yet to obtain the proper Environmental Compliance Certificate 
(ECC) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), however it 
has already begun to take action in the area. It has been clearing the land it now owns or 
rents and has begun to clear the land it is seeking title for where the Sibolo airstrip will 
be. They have placed markers in the water indicating the area that they plan to dredge and 
have told planters to move out of it. Residents are very confused about their rights and 
are not planting as many lines for fear that the company will take them when they want to 
start the project. At the meeting, the company representative implied to the residents that 
since the company owns the land, they also control the water. Residents were not aware 
of the Philippines fisheries laws which state, “municipal waters include all the bodies of 
water within the municipality, such as streams, rivers, ponds, lakes, and also portions of 
the coastal waters within fifteen (15) kilometers from the shoreline.” It is the local 
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government who controls these municipal waters and Sec. 2 (d) of the Fisheries Code 
clearly mandates the LGU “to protect the rights of fisherfolk, especially the local 
communities with priority to municipal fisherfolk, in the preferential use of the municipal 
waters” (p. xxx, emphasis added). The company and local politicians seem to be taking 
advantage of the lack of knowledge and confidence on the part of local seaweed planters. 
 
7.3 Risk Averse Peasant vs. Capitalist Company? 
 
 Although Fil Estates is a development company from Manila, it is too easy to 
frame this struggle as a case of outside company against a united community. Whithin 
this clearly uneven power struggle, there are also internal differences on the islands. 
Some people in the community agree with the proposal, while others do not. Within 
families there are conflicting opinions. In some cases, decisions about shared family land 
have led to quarrels. Some members of the community argue that the long term life of the 
island will be threatened, while others look at the immediate gain they can receive from 
selling their land. There are those people who have not seen as much of a significant rise 
in their standard of living from seaweed farming as others and the prospect of money 
from the company is tempting. The company seems ready to exploit these tensions and is 
exacerbating them by making different promises to different people. 
 Nor is this a case of peasants rejecting capitalist intrusion in their space. Residents 
here have been quick to take up opportunities to farm market crops and join cash 
economies. People have experience with private property. Land titling exists here in 
different forms already and is mixed with open access commons. This is a struggle about 
control over access to resources and control over the related choices of livelihood 
strategy. 
 Seaweed cultivation has certainly integrated Caluya into global markets, but the 
spread of it as a livelihood while rapid, has been what some might call ‘organic’. It was 
embraced and shared by residents themselves as a new opportunity. Although, planters 
are producing a privately owned commodity, to do so they have not had to privatize the 
production area or limit access to the commons. People in this industry are entrepreneurs 
who own their seaweed farms and control the means of production. Some might argue 
whether this is indeed a capitalist society. Wood argues that a society is not capitalist 
unless all members are dependent on the market for their survival, while in non-capitalist 
societies people may take advantage of market opportunities, but maintain direct access 
to the means of production (in Hall 2004). Others (Gibson-Graham 2005; Mansfield 
2007), would argue that capitalist relations can never be complete and are always buoyed 
by non-market activities. Nonetheless, Caluya is involved in what Hall calls “analytical 
stand-ins for capitalism” such as market relations, commercialization, and global 
economics (Hall 2004, 402) and as such is vulnerable in some ways. The economy here 
might be more aptly labeled a hybrid economy with one foot firmly planted in global 
markets and the other in subsistence. Similar to what Dodds (1998) describes in another 
context, in Caluya the fluctuation cycle in various markets and livelihood strategies has 
created opportunities to enjoy market benefits, but, thus far, they have not come under 
long term corporate control and have maintained economic autonomy. 
 In stark contrast, the integration of Caluya into global markets through tourism is 
taking place through very different processes. The development plans are more closely 
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following capitalist market processes. First, possible enclosure of open access resources 
through de facto privatization of beachfronts and marine spaces; second, the loss of 
resource control leads to the loss of ownership over the means of production for seaweed 
farming, turning owners into wage labourers, more dependent on a third party for 
survival; third, the process is being led by top down, outside force with the collusion of 
local elites. This, like seaweed cultivation, is also situated in larger networks of power 
including state policies through the DENR and the Department of Tourism. As Sneddon 
(2007) argues, capitalist development alone is not sufficient to explain the process at 
work here. Consolidation of resources can often be a case of giving political favours to 
ensure stability and the result of power struggles at extra-local level. 
 
7.4 Implications for Residents 
 
 The question is, whose rights and freedoms are enhanced by these processes in 
Clauya, and how may inequities be exacerbated by such enclosure and dispossession? A 
seaweed buyer states his answer to this: 
 
“When I was Barangay Captain, the municipal government wanted to give 
Sibato a budget to be a tourism area but the people of Sibato are not in 
favour of tourism because their seaweeds will be wiped out… [Tourism for 
the people of Sibato] means losing seaweed.  We people of Sibato don’t 
agree because young and old people plant seaweed, but in tourism only the 
people with money will be benefited.” 
 
 Tourism may offer benefits to the community including a more diverse job base, 
entrepreneurial opportunities, opportunities for the emerging university and college 
educated younger generation, and increased services such as regular transportation to the 
mainland, electricity, improved health clinic, and new water sources. If the processes is 
undertaken with a more inclusive approach residents may be able to steer the 
development and guarantee more benefits. While being careful not to be overly predictive 
before this plan comes to fruition, with the help of research conducted on tourism 
development elsewhere I feel that some cautionary analysis of the future is warranted.  
 Stefan Gossling’s (2003, 2005) work in Zanibar showcases a similar conflict 
between seaweed cultivation and tourism development. Seaweed planting has now been 
displaced and pushed to marginal areas. This has resulted in a loss of income for seaweed 
planters as well as degradation to environments with a lot of coral, which are not suitable 
for seaweed cultivation (Gossling 2003). Tourism has impacted other environments on 
the island through increased deforestation, use of local building materials, sand quarrying 
and conversion of land (Gossling 2003). Many are leaving the community to look for 
work because they lack capital and knowledge to invest in the tourism sector, while 
conversely, there has been a large influx of migrants looking for work in tourism 
(Gossling 2005). This has led to additional stresses on local land and food resources. 
Closer to the context of Clauya, on nearby Boracay Island, Carter (2004) documents that 
initial economic promises have often ended up as net losses for the original residents. 
There has been a net loss of jobs as companies are consolidated under outside investment 
and labour with the appropriate skills is imported. Trousdale (1999) shows that Boracay 
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residents are exposed to market fluctuations and living costs have skyrocketed without 
accompanying income increases for many. Erosion of property rights has become a big 
issue on Boracay and Fil Estates, the same development company involved in Caluya, 
has been accused of clearing land and establishing infrastructure on property they do not 
own (Trousdale 1999). La Vina (2001) shows that competition between users for coastal 
resources is widespread in the Philippines and has often proved disastrous for small-scale 
marine users with most of the financial benefits accruing to users from outside the 
community and elites. This is further exacerbated by collusion of the local government 
which is in charge of zoning and the prohibitive expense of taking the companies like Fil 
Estate to court Trousdale 1999). As Cooke (2004) argues, low-barrier access is crucial for 
the survival of marine-based livelihoods. It is difficult to imagine that the stated benefits 
of a tourism that is not community controlled will reach to the lower social levels in 
Caluya. As mentioned earlier, Caluya is not lacking for municipal money and yet basic 
services like clean water and electricity, which are again being promised in the guise of 
tourist development, have yet to materialize. 
 Using the above case studies and earlier analysis of why seaweed cultivation has 
improved lives here, I argue that following may be some implications of future tourist 
development in Caluya. The loss of access and control over resources that are currently 
the basis of production, means that many residents will be forced into wage labour work 
either on the island or away. This also means a return to previous problems with labour 
division and lack of control over labour time. Earlier the importance of labour flexibility 
and control over time allocation was discussed as being essential to food security and 
preservation of diverse livelihood strategies that include land farming, fishing, gleaning, 
and other small businesses. Flexible time is essential in maintenance of the diverse 
economy, which is so important for the well being and redistributive aspects of the 
community. As well, a simultaneous loss of access to the emergency cash seaweed offers 
and the social credits redistributive system may lead people into unmanageable debt. The 
income for wage labour being offered by the company, about 1500 pesos a month, does 
not come close to the cash income being earned by most seaweed planters and to earn this 
people would be working long hours, controlled by the company. It is clear that access to 
cash is not the only factor creating stable livelihoods here. The result of these changes to 
the socionatural relations may be a return to economic marginalization. This is further 
compounded by the dispossession of people’s agricultural lands to development and the 
loss of their ‘exit’ strategy. 
 Political ecology’s marginalization and degradation theory argues that under 
conditions of marginalization and social disruption ecosystem degradation tends to follow 
as people are forced to exploit more marginal resources (Robbins 2004). This is not to 
say that environmental degradation did not exist before. Illegal fishing, still practiced by 
a few fishers in deep water, was once rampant here, but with the introduction of a safer, 
viable livelihood it has now stopped. Environmental conservation is certainly not part of 
most people’s deliberate actions here. There is no communal landfill and garbage is 
usually burned, but is often seen being tossed into the ocean. Plastics and disposable 
items are very new commodities here and people seem to treat them as they do 
biodegradable garbage, tossing it back to nature when finished with it. Some people are 
becoming aware of waste practices as garbage increases with commodity import. Thus 
far, though, it is not overwhelming since there is relatively little non-organic waste. It 
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may be more difficult for the ecosystem to handle the waste and garbage of a sudden 
influx of tourists and workers. The reduction here of ecosystem exploitation that has 
accompanied seaweed cultivation is because this economic improvement has come 
without people being dispossessed or pushed onto marginal lands. 
 In short, tourism development pushes market relations into the centre of life here, 
potentially undermining stable socionatural structures and disrupting the constellation of 
conditions that keep this system viable.  
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8. Conclusions 
 
 Actors involved in the struggle between seaweed cultivation and tourist 
development clearly hold uneven power to affect the outcome. Nevertheless, there are 
people who are ready to oppose the development. How can weaker actors resist 
development intrusion in their space? Bryant (1997) suggests two factors that are already 
beginning to emerge in Caluya: first, the powerful may not have a socially persuasive 
enough argument to win support without forceful coercion, and second, the power of 
collaboration. Clearly, as more is revealed about Fil Estate’s plans to residents in Caluya, 
they are questioning the supposed benefits and critically thinking through the 
implications of tourism coming to their area. In the barangays directly affected, though 
there are some who support the development, the vast majority of residents I spoke with 
are adamantly opposed to it, even amongst those who would stand to benefit from it. 
However, there is talk, but very little action as of yet. This may be for a number of 
reasons, the first of which, feelings of inferiority and intimidation, I touch upon last 
section. This is not just true at the planters’ level. Municipal officials are in desperate 
need of more funding and support to do their work properly. For example, the Municipal 
Development Officer wants to halt any further development on the plans until a new 
municipal development plan can be completed. The last was done in 1999 and includes 
almost no mention of seaweed cultivation and does not zone for it or for tourism. These 
plans are expensive and time consuming to complete and the officer is under threat of 
removal since the new mayor took office. After speaking with me on numerous 
occasions, and knowing that I would be returning to the University of the Philippines, he 
asked me to present the issue to professors at UPV in the hope that someone would be 
interested in helping. It is common for professors at UPV to use such opportunities to 
train students in field techniques and, in fact a professor has expressed interest for this 
year.  
 Residents of Sibolo, Sibato, and Imba barangays echoed this request for help as 
they learnt about the proposal through my research. Thus, my involvement in the issue 
became one of more than just a research observer. My relationship to many people 
became one of linking social capital, what Turner (2007) describes as a tie that enables 
connections between differing social and economic groups. The assumption of expertise 
people placed on me made it difficult to explain that my own power outside Caluya was 
just as a student with networks I could try to tap into. Nevertheless, as I explored more 
about the proposal and residents’ opinions, I became increasingly concerned that the 
company was taking advantage of the community, lying to them about their rights, 
undertaking potentially environmentally damaging work without the proper permits, and 
undermining a relatively stable, prosperous economic system that is increasingly rare to 
find in coastal Philippines. People clearly were not aware of laws around use of 
municipal waters and their rights as residents near a proposed large-scale development to 
ask for social assessment and consultation.  
 The isolation of the municipality is problematic for residents when faced with this 
type of issue. Most people have no access to information or groups that can help because 
there are very few communication links. There are no landline telephones, no email, the 
cellphone signal is weak, and it is difficult to find places to load your cellphone with 
minutes. The ‘linking capital’ I could offer consisted of connecting residents to an NGO 
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in the city that works with communities fighting unwanted development and a journalist 
who reports on social issues. I brought information back and forth between the two, 
ensuring each party had contact numbers and names before I had to leave. I also brought 
the development to the attention of the Seaweed Industry Association during my 
interviews and they are very concerned, given the shortage already of seaweed producers 
in the Philippines. This could be an important tie for the planters to some very powerful 
actors with access to government. With all the research I was collecting, I was also able 
to begin to draw a larger picture of interconnections for both the residents and the NGO 
to work with. The NGO stressed that it is imperative for those in the community in 
opposition, to draft a position statement and submit it to the DENR before the permits are 
approved to signal community dissatisfaction with the plans. They, understandable, 
wanted to be contacted by someone from the community before traveling there to help. 
 Although, there is a strong, core group that is ready to oppose the development, 
and they are armed with all the contact information needed, they have yet to contact the 
NGO. This could be for numerous reasons. One possibility is that the people on Sibolo 
are not aware of how urgent it is to act. Time seems to move differently there and weeks 
go by in a rhythm of daily activity. There is no television news and very little radio news 
of the outside world and such a large change to island life seems unimaginable. 
Meanwhile, Fil Estate is working on ‘Manila time’ and continuing with permit 
applications. People vowed to take action if any machines started, but by then it might be 
too late. Also, barangay elections happened on the islands shortly after I left and 
everything was at a standstill for weeks before, during, and after. Both of the new 
barangay captains of Sibato and Sibolo are in the core opposition group and I am in touch 
with one of them still. To date, there has been no further work on the site, so hopefully, 
the collaborative links that have been established will flourish in the future.  
 
8.1 Broader Lessons from Caluya’s Experiences 
 
 Is this just a unique and exceptional case or can there be larger lessons drawn 
from Caluya’s struggles and experiences with market integration? Previous studies on 
seaweed cultivation and aquaculture as development in general are too often focused 
solely on technical ‘how tos’ or enumerating success through aggregate poverty statistics. 
In this type of analysis, seaweed cultivation and tourism development may seem equally 
beneficial to rural communities in the creation of jobs and increase in income level. As 
this study has argued, though, not all market experiences are equal if investigated at the 
level of people’s experiences and perceptions (Paulson & Gezon 2005; Irz et al. 2006). In 
this sense, tourism development in Caluya, may benefit quality of life if measured by 
income, but if the definition includes a degree of sovereignty over one’s labour and 
resources as well as the ecological well-being of community, the answers lies beyond 
detached measures. My study suggests that there may be a ‘tipping point’ of market 
integration where a certain amount of control is relinquished to those outside the 
community and the social structure begins to break down. 
 Several key points emerge from the comparison between seaweed cultivation and 
tourist development in Caluya that I will conclude with. My research raises the possibility 
of identifying certain conditions that link market integration to positive benefits, rather 
than to marginalization, and explores the configurations under which those linkages are 
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most likely to occur (Robbins 2004). These conditions include: a degree of sovereignty 
over choices for individuals, families and communities; the ability of actors to maintain 
flexibility and diversity in myriad forms; and the degree to which market relations govern 
social reproduction. These conditions must be understood in their relation to the 
materiality within which they are embedded. Not only does the political economic sphere 
construct nature, but, as this research demonstrates, the enabling and constraining role of 
nature co-constitutes social possibilities. Without an awareness of this it is difficult to 
understand why complex processes proceed as they do.   
 Configurations of power are also important to focus on in order to understand 
how actors can creatively and beneficially integrate global markets into their livelihood 
strategies as well as seeing how specific historical and extra-local factors influence the 
shape of local socionatural systems. By demonstrating the interrelations between humans, 
non-humans, places and events in Caluya and clarifying how these relations are 
produced, I hope that lessons from this particular case can be useful in generating broader 
claims and understandings. 
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Map 1. Location of the Municipality of Caluya, Antique Province, Philippines 
 Research sites are underlined. The light blue water indicates shallows and roughly corresponds to the seaweed planting areas. 
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